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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
This dissertation is an economic analysis of the legal aspects of international trade
institutions. In particular, I analyze the system of remedies, the role of a court for interna-
tional trade disputes, and settlement bargaining in an international setting.
In the next chapter, I take a mechanism-design approach to characterize a po-
litically optimal trade agreement under the assumptions that negotiations occur in the
presence of uncertainty about future political pressures and governments have asymmetric
information about realized political pressures. The solution to this problem characterizes
the optimal remedy system for breach of trade agreements. The main finding of this chapter
is that an optimal mechanism involves less-than-proportional retaliation against deviating
parties. This result is in contrast to some proposals to allow for more-than-proportional
retaliation in the WTO. I also consider an institutional structure in which only commen-
surate retaliation is practical but governments can employ a public randomizing device to
authorize retaliation. I show that it is optimal to authorize retaliation only randomly. This
suggests a potential role for the WTO dispute settlement process as a public randomizing
device.
In Chapter III, I propose a framework within which to interpret and evaluate the
major reforms introduced to the GATT system in its transition to the WTO. In particular,
I examine the WTO Agreement on Safeguards that has replaced the GATT escape clause
(Article XIX), and the Dispute Settlement Process (DSP) that resembles a court of law
under the WTO. Using this framework, I interpret the weakening of the reciprocity princi-
ple under the Agreement on Safeguards as an attempt to reduce eﬃciency-reducing trade
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skirmishes. The DSP is interpreted as an impartial arbitrator that issues nonbinding rulings
about the state of the world when a dispute arises among member countries. I demonstrate
that the reforms in the GATT escape clause should be bundled with the introduction of
the DSP, in order to maintain the incentive-compatibility of trade agreements. The model
implies that trade agreements under the WTO lead to fewer trade skirmishes but this eﬀect
does not necessarily result in higher payoﬀs to the governments. The model also implies that
the introduction of the WTO court, which has no enforcement power, can actually improve
the self-enforceability of trade agreements. My analysis also shows that the WTO court can
improve the parties’ expected welfare by adopting a strategic anti-trade or pro-trade bias.
In Chapter IV, I utilize canonical models of settlement bargaining under asym-
metric information (namely, Bebchuk 1984, and Reinganum and Wilde 1986) to analyze
the dispute settlement patterns in the World Trade Organization. I extend these models to
study the determinants of out-of-court settlement in a situation where the parties’ relation-
ship is characterized by a prisoners’ dilemma– a feature of most trade partnerships. This
added feature alters the prediction of the classic models that the allocation of litigation
costs between disputants has no bearing on the likelihood of settlement. In particular, I
find that the likelihood of settlement is more sensitive to the defendant’s litigation costs
than to the complainant’s litigation costs.
In Chapter V, I estimate the bargaining models introduced in Chapter IV, using a
database of the WTO disputes. I conduct both structural and reduced form analysis and I
find evidence in support of the bargaining models as extended in this paper. In particular,
the distribution of litigation costs between the disputants is an important determinant of
settlement likelihood. My empirical analysis also suggests that the existence of third parties
that may be aﬀected by the outcome of the dispute has a significantly positive eﬀect on the
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likelihood of out-of-court settlement.
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CHAPTER II
OPTIMAL REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS
Introduction
Viewing international trade agreements as contracts among politically-motivated
governments has been a popular thesis among scholars. Following this paradigm, diﬀerent
aspects of trade agreements have been analyzed using insights from contract theory. In
particular, attempts have been made to understand the renegotiation and compensation
provisions in trade agreements as mechanisms to promote eﬃcient breach of contracts.
This paper contributes to this literature by characterizing the most eﬃcient remedy system
for violation of trade agreements among politically-motivated governments.
In this paper, I take the view that by signing trade agreements, governments try
to maximize their political welfare in an uncertain political and economic environment. In
the absence of cooperation, each government uses its trade policy instruments too aggres-
sively so that the political welfare reaped by one government comes at a higher cost to
other governments. Governments can escape from this Prisoners’ Dilemma by entering into
an agreement that limits their ability to manipulate trade policy instruments.1 Neverthe-
less, governments may occasionally find themselves under intense pressure from domestic
interest groups to deviate from their international trade obligations. In such circumstances,
taking a protectionist measure to dissipate political pressures in the importing country may
cause more political gains to the government of the importing country than costs to the
1Bagwell and Staiger (1999) and Bagwell and Staiger (2002, chapter 2) provide an elegant formulation of
this idea.
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government of the exporting country. In other words, abiding with the agreement in the
presence of intense political pressure causes a net loss in terms of joint political welfare.
Under most trade agreements, signatories are free to suspend or withdraw their
obligations without the consent of other contracting parties. In response to this initial
violation, however, the aﬀected parties will be also free to suspend substantially equal
obligations or concessions. Withdrawal of previously granted concessions by the victim
countries can be interpreted as a form of remedy for breach of contracts. Sykes (1991) and
Schwartz and Sykes (2002) interpret the authorization of reciprocal reaction to an initial
deviation as an award of “expectation damages”, which places the victim in as good a
position as it would have been in if the violator had honored its obligations. Following
this definition, Schwartz and Sykes (2002, p. S182) argue that “expectation damages thus
deter ineﬃcient breach because the promisor will not wish to violate and pay expectation
damages unless the promisor gains more from the breach than the promisee loses, in which
case breach is eﬃcient.”
In this paper, however, I argue that a system that employs expectation damages,
the so-called liability rule system, is not the most eﬃcient mechanism for handling breach
of international trade agreements. The point of departure is the observation that an injured
party in an international trade setting usually receives compensations by withdrawing its
own concessions that have been previously granted to the oﬀending country. This method
of compensation is eﬃciency-reducing since, as discussed above, withdrawal of concessions
in normal situations causes a net loss to the contracting parties. In fact, an important
underlying assumption on which the eﬃciency of a liability rule mechanism is established
is the availability of cash transfer, or other eﬃciency-neutral side payments, as a method
of compensation. When such eﬃciency-neutral side payments are not available, it is in the
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best interest of all parties, ex ante, to agree on a remedy system that awards the smallest
possible damages to victims.
Notwithstanding its ineﬃciency, awards to the victim cannot be reduced to zero if
governments have private information regarding the state of the world. That is because in
the absence of a system that imposes suﬃcient costs on breaching parties, governments will
have the incentive to exaggerate the political and economic costs of honoring their trade
obligations in order to legitimize their protectionist pursuits.
I model a trade agreement as an optimal mechanism whose objective is to maximize
the joint political welfare of the governments while it induces truthful revelation of private
information by all parties. The main finding is that an optimal mechanism involves less-
than-proportional retaliation against deviating parties.
This result conflicts with the proposals to allow for more-than-proportional retali-
ation against a violating country in the WTO. I argue that these proposals do not follow an
eﬃciency rationale; instead, these are motivated by the observation that reciprocity does
not compensate a breached-upon party for all of its loss. As Bagwell (2007) correctly points
out, “commensurate retaliation preserves the terms of trade but results in a reduced trade
volume. Hence, [...] commensurate retaliation leaves the foreign government with less wel-
fare than it would have enjoyed at the initially negotiated tariﬀs.” In other words, a liability
rule mechanism prescribes a more-than-proportional retaliation, which, as I show in this
paper, is not optimal.
I also consider an institutional setting in which disproportionate retaliation is not
practical but a public randomizing device is available that can be used to authorize retali-
ation on a random basis. This institutional configuration may have some practical appeal.
First, as Howse and Staiger (2005) and Bagwell (2007) point out, important measurement
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problems significantly limit the feasibility of a system with disproportionate retaliation.
Second, one can interpret the WTO dispute settlement system as a public randomizing
device that authorizes retaliation with a fixed probability. I find that the optimal prob-
ability of retaliation is strictly less than one. Optimality of random, rather than certain,
retaliation once again indicates the fact that reciprocal retaliation is too severe to induce
eﬃcient behavior by governments.
Before concluding this chapter I will discuss the fairness of the optimal remedy
system. One may argue against a system that authorizes less-than-proportional retaliation
by questioning the fairness of the system. In fact, as noted above, a victim is not fully-
compensated under an optimal remedy system in the WTO. However, ex ante, that is,
when political pressures are not yet realized, the expected value of the agreement is the
same to both governments. Therefore, governments maintain a balance of concessions ex
ante, although such a balance may not materialize ex post. Moreover, if governments have
repeated interaction over time, a country that stands to lose from an optimal remedy system
in some periods will be overcompensated in periods when it finds it optimal to suspend its
obligations in response to domestic pressures. In other words, governments can maintain an
intertemporal balance of concessions under an optimal trade agreement through repeated
interactions.
Basic setup
Consider a pair of distinct goods x and y with demand functions in the home
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country (no *) and the foreign country (*) given by:
Dx (px) = 1− px, Dy (py) = 1− py, (II.1)
D∗x (p
∗
x) = 1− p∗x, D∗y
¡
p∗y
¢
= 1− p∗y,
where p (with the appropriate index) represents the price of a good in a certain country.
Specific import tariﬀs, τ and τ∗, that are chosen by countries as the only trade policy
instrument, create a gap between domestic and foreign prices. In particular, px = p∗x + τ
and py = p∗y − τ∗.
Both countries produce both goods using the following supply functions:
Qx (px) = px, Qy (py) = bpy, (II.2)
Q∗x (p
∗
x) = bp
∗
x, Q
∗
y
¡
p∗y
¢
= p∗y.
Assuming b > 1, the home country will be a natural importer of x and a natural exporter
of y.
Under this model, the market-clearing price of x (y) depends only on the home
(foreign) tariﬀ. Let px (τ) and py (τ∗) respectively denote the equilibrium prices of x and y
in the home country. If import tariﬀs are non-prohibitive (i.e., if they are suﬃciently small)
trade occurs between the countries and the home consumers’ surplus from the consumption
of x and y will be given by
ψx (τ) ≡
Z 1
px(τ)
Dx (u) du, ψy (τ
∗) ≡
Z 1
py(τ∗)
Dy (u) du.
Moreover, the home producers’ surplus from the sale of x and y will be given by
πx (τ) ≡
Z px(τ)
0
Qx (u) du, πy (τ∗) ≡
Z py(τ∗)
0
Qy (u) du.
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The government’s tariﬀ revenue is given by
T (τ) ≡ τMx (px (τ)) ,
where Mx (px) ≡ Dx (px)−Qx (px) is the import demand for good x in the home country.
For reasons that will be clear later, I assume that there is another pair of goods,
which are produced and consumed in an identical manner as above. This duplicate economy
will make the modelling of the retaliation scheme very simple.
A Political Objective Function
Following Baldwin (1987), I assume that each government maximizes a weighted
sum of its producers’ surplus, consumers’ surplus, and tariﬀ revenues with a relatively higher
weight on the surplus of its import-competing sector. The higher weight given to the welfare
of a sector might be the result of political pressure, through lobbying for example, that a
government faces. Denoting the political weight on the welfare of the import-competing
sector in the home (foreign) country by θ (θ∗), where θ, θ∗ ≥ 1, I assume that the home
government’s welfare drawn from sector x as a function of the home import tariﬀ is given
by
u (τ ; θ) ≡ ψx (τ) + θπx (τ) + T (τ) ,
and the home government’s welfare from sector y as a function of the foreign import tariﬀ
is given by
v (τ∗) ≡ ψy (τ∗) + πy (τ∗) .
Therefore, u (τ ; θ) + v (τ∗) represents the political welfare of the home government, which
is additively separable in functions of the home and foreign tariﬀs. The home government’s
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welfare is increasing in the home tariﬀ and decreasing in the foreign tariﬀ when these tariﬀs
are suﬃciently low.
Private Political Pressures
I assume that political pressures can take two levels, i.e., low and high, denoted
respectively by θ and θ. Remember that each country has two import-competing industries
which may exert political pressure in order to restrict imports of the like products. I assume
that these pressures are realized according to the following probability distribution:
Pr (high pressure from both industries) = 0,
Pr (high pressure from only one industry) = ρ,
Pr (no high pressure) = 1− ρ,
where, 0 < ρ < 1.
This probability distribution ensures that in each country there is at least one
import-competing industry that exerts low political pressure. I assume that this low-
political-pressure industry is used by the government to retaliate against a deviating country
when retaliation is authorized. This structure allows me to focus my analysis on the import
tariﬀs of the home country in the potentially high-political-pressure sector, and the retal-
iatory tariﬀs of the foreign country in the low-political-pressure sector. Due to symmetry,
the foreign (home) country’s import (retaliatory) tariﬀs are identical to those of the home
(foreign) country. Therefore, in what follows I restrict my attention to the home coun-
try’s import tariﬀ in the potentially high-political-pressure sector and the foreign country’s
retaliatory tariﬀs that are implemented in the low-political pressure sector.
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Benchmarks: The first-best agreement and non-cooperation
In this Section, I characterize the first-best agreement as well as the non-cooperative
trade policies in order to set a benchmark to discuss the optimal trade agreement under
information asymmetry, which will be presented in Section 4.
In the absence of cooperation, the home government would choose τ to maximize
u (τ ; θ)+ v (τ∗). This is tantamount to choosing a tariﬀ rate that maximizes the home gov-
ernment’s welfare from its import-competing sector, u (τ ; θ). Therefore, the non-cooperative
(Nash) tariﬀ as a function of political pressure is given by
τN (θ) ≡ argmax
τ
u (τ ; θ) . (II.3)
In setting its policy unilaterally, the home government ignores the impact of its tariﬀ on
the welfare of the foreign government which is captured by v (τ). The foreign country’s
non-cooperative tariﬀ, τ∗N (θ∗), can be defined similarly.2
In a first-best situation where governments have symmetric information regarding
the state of the world and they can commit to their promises, the most eﬃcient agreement
is one that maximizes the joint political welfare, or u (τ ; θ) + v (τ). In other words, the
politically-eﬃcient import tariﬀ, τPE (θ), is given by
τPE (θ) = argmax
τ
u (τ ; θ) + v (τ) . (II.4)
Given the two levels of political pressure, θ and θ, a politically-eﬃcient agreement specifies
a two-step tariﬀ schedule, namely, l = τPE (θ) and s = τPE
¡
θ
¢
, where l < s. The low
tariﬀ rate, l, can be interpreted as the tariﬀ rate to be set by governments under normal
2My analysis relies on the assumption that any tariﬀs that governments may rationally choose are non-
prohibitive. Since setting a tariﬀ higher than τN (θ) is not individually rational, this assumption is satisfied
if τN (θ) is not prohibitive. I assume that political pressures are suﬃciently low such that τN

θ

< τproh.,
where τproh. denotes the lowest prohibitive tariﬀ rate.
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τ
*τ
)(θτ PE
)(θτ PE
Figure 1. Nash and Politically Eﬃcient tariﬀs when both governments face low political
pressure
situations, that is, when θ = θ, and s can be interpreted as the safeguard-level tariﬀ rate
that governments can choose when they face high political pressure. Alternatively, setting
s = τPE
¡
θ
¢
when a government truly faces a high political pressure can be interpreted as
eﬃcient breach of an agreement that specifies a low tariﬀ rate, that is, l = τPE (θ).3
Points N and A in Figure 1 respectively show the non-cooperative and politically-
eﬃcient tariﬀ pairs for the case where θ = θ∗ = θ. Governments can gain by mutually
reducing their tariﬀ rates from τN (θ) to τPE (θ) , or equivalently, by moving from N to A.
The joint-welfare contours are also drawn in Figure 1. As can be seen on the graph, point
A is at the center of the joint-welfare contours and it is associated with the highest joint
welfare.
Figure 2, on the other hand, depicts a situation where the home country faces high
3I assume that τPE

θ

< τN (θ).This assumption ensures that if an agreement sets a tariﬀ binding
equal to or smaller than τPE

θ

, the governments will always choose the highest tariﬀ authorized under the
agreement.
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Figure 2. The initial tariﬀ pair, A, is no longer optimal when the home government faces
high political pressure
political pressure. Note that as a result of the political shock in the home country, the iso-
welfare curve of the home country has changed so that the two countries’ welfare contours
are no longer tangent at point A. Figure 2 also depicts the new joint-welfare contours that
are centered around B. Point B is the politically-eﬃcient tariﬀ pair when the home country
is faced with high political pressure.
A politically-eﬃcient agreement is thus a complete contract that prescribes the
tariﬀ pair A to the contingency where the home country is facing low political pressure, and
the tariﬀ pair B to the contingency where the home country is facing high political pressure.4
Note that since retaliation is eﬃciency-reducing the politically-eﬃcient agreement prescribes
no retaliation against a safeguard-imposing country. However, this first-best agreement is
feasible only if political pressures are publicly observable. In the next Section, I characterize
the most eﬃcient contract in the presence of information asymmetry regarding political
4Remember that my analysis is focused on the case where the home country is a potential safeguard-
imposing country and the foreign country is the potential aﬀected party (see section II.2.2).
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pressure.
Optimal remedies and eﬃcient breach
The first best agreement set out above can be achieved only if political pressures
are publicly observable and, hence, contractible. However, in the presence of informa-
tion asymmetry regarding political pressure, the agreement must operate as a revelation
mechanism that gives the governments proper incentives to reveal their private information
truthfully. To find the optimal mechanism, I assume that the agreement will specify a
three-step tariﬀ schedule, denoted by (l, s, r) , where l and s have the same interpretation
as before and r denotes the tariﬀ rates that the exporting country (i.e., the foreign country)
can choose in response to a safeguard in the importing country (i.e., the home country). I
assume that the negotiators choose (l, s, r) to maximize the expected joint political welfare
of the governments, or,
max
l,s,r
2 (1− ρ) [u (l; θ) + v (l)] + ρ
£
u
¡
s; θ
¢
+ v (r) + u (r; θ) + v (s)
¤
, (II.5)
subject to incentive compatibility constraints, which are given by
u (s; θ) + v (r) ≤ u (l; θ) + v (l) , (II.6)
and
u
¡
l; θ
¢
+ v (l) ≤ u
¡
s; θ
¢
+ v (r) . (II.7)
The first term in (II.5) is the joint welfare of the governments when the home country faces
low political pressure multiplied by the probability of this contingency, (1− ρ). Similarly,
the second term in this objective function is the joint welfare of the governments when the
home country faces high political pressure multiplied by the probability of this contingency,
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ρ. Inequality (II.6) represents the truth-telling, or incentive compatibility, condition for the
home government when it faces a low political pressure. The left-hand side of this inequality
shows the political welfare of the government that misrepresents its political pressure when
it actually faces low political pressure. The first term on the left-hand side, u (s; θ), is the
political welfare that the home government derives from the import sector by imposing a
safeguard when θ = θ. The second term, v (r), is the political welfare driven from the
export sector that faces retaliatory tariﬀ rates from the foreign country. Inequality (II.7) ,
which is the truth-telling condition when θ = θ, has a similar interpretation.
Denoting the optimal solution to the above problem with superscript Optimal, we
can state the following:
Proposition 1 τPE (θ) = lOptimal < rOptimal < sOptimal < τPE
¡
θ
¢
.
This Proposition is illustrated in Figure 3. This figure depicts the welfare contours
of the home country and the joint-welfare contours when the home country faces low and
high political pressure, respectively. The optimal agreement is given by two tariﬀ pairs at
points A and C. Point A =
¡
lOptimal, lOptimal
¢
is the politically optimal (and politically
eﬃcient) tariﬀ pair when political pressure in the home country is low. On the other hand,
point C =
¡
sOptimal, rOptimal
¢
is the politically optimal tariﬀ pair under high political pres-
sure in the home country. The politically optimal agreement maximizes the joint political
welfare while it leaves the home country indiﬀerent between the two tariﬀ schedules, A and
C, when it faces low political pressure. As can be seen in Figure 3, points A and C are
located on the same welfare contour of the home country under low political pressure. This
welfare contour is also tangent to the joint-welfare contour at point C, which ensures that
point C generates the highest joint welfare among the incentive compatible tariﬀ schedules.
Since C is located below the 45-degree line from the origin, the politically optimal
15
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Figure 3. Graphical illustration of Proposition 1
retaliatory tariﬀ, rOptimal, is smaller than the politically optimal safeguard tariﬀ, sOptimal.
Given symmetric countries, the fact that rOptimal < sOptimal implies that:
Corollary 1 Optimal retaliation is less than proportional to the oﬀense committed by the
safeguard-imposing country.
In particular, this result suggests that reciprocal retaliation is not politically op-
timal. If we impose reciprocity as a requirement, the most eﬃcient tariﬀ schedule is given
by point D at which the 45-degree line is tangent to the joint-welfare contour. Note that
the tariﬀ schedule (A,D) is incentive compatible because the home government prefers A
to D when θ = θ, and prefers D to A when θ = θ. However, as can be seen in Figure 3,
point D is located on a lower joint welfare contour compared to point C. As a result, the
best tariﬀ schedule under reciprocity, which is given by (A,D) , results in a lower expected
joint welfare than the tariﬀ schedule (A,C).
A second observation from Proposition 1 is that the safeguard tariﬀ, sOptimal, is
smaller than the politically-eﬃcient tariﬀ, τPE
¡
θ
¢
, when a government faces high political
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pressure. In fact, point B on Figure 3, which is the politically-eﬃcient tariﬀs pair when
the home country faces high pressure, is not incentive compatible. Therefore, as a second
corollary to Proposition 1, we have:
Corollary 2 When governments have asymmetric information, the optimal safeguard tariﬀ
is smaller than the politically-eﬃcient tariﬀ under high political pressure.
This under-utilization of the safeguard measures can be interpreted as an attempt
to curb eﬃciency-reducing retaliations that are triggered by the imposition of safeguard
measures. That is because if a higher safeguard tariﬀ is authorized under the agreement,
a higher retaliatory tariﬀ is required to maintain incentive compatibility. However, note
that one critical assumption behind this result is the unavailability of cash payments or
any other eﬃciency-neutral method of compensation. If such side payments were available
and enforceable, an agreement can ensure eﬃcient breach by requiring a breaching party
to fully compensate the aﬀected party through side payments. That is, a liability rule can
ensure eﬃcient performance of the agreement if, and only if, side payments such as cash are
available.
Randomized retaliation
In the previous Section, I assumed that trade negotiators specify a retaliatory
tariﬀ rate, r, to be used against a safeguard-imposing country. Then I showed that an opti-
mal trade agreement should prescribe less-than-proportional retaliation against a violating
country. However, most international trade agreements follow a principle of reciprocity that
specifies commensurate retaliation. For example, Article XIX of GATT allows a country
that is aﬀected by a safeguard measure to withdraw “substantially equivalent concessions”
against the safeguard-imposing country. One practical appeal of the reciprocity principle
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is its simplicity compared to a disproportionate retaliation scheme. That is because, as
pointed out by Howse and Staiger (2005), the use of a disproportionate remedy system may
cause important measurement problems due to the subtle political and economic welfare
eﬀects of trade policy adjustments.
In this Section I impose a reciprocity constraint, that is, s = r, on the negotiators’
problem, but allow for randomized retaliation against a violating country. Specifically, I
assume that the negotiators can design a public randomizing device that authorizes retali-
ation with probability α ∈ [0, 1] . In fact, according to the WTO Agreement on Safeguards,
commensurate retaliation is subject to the approval of the WTO dispute settlement system
whose rulings are uncertain. Therefore, one may interpret the WTO dispute settlement
system as a randomizing device. This way of modeling the dispute settlement system is
similar to that of Reinhardt (2001) and Rosendorﬀ (2005), but they stop short of finding
the optimal randomization strategy.
I assume that the negotiators choose α, l, and s to maximize the expected joint
welfare of the governments, that is,
max
l,s,α
2 (1− ρ) [u (l; θ) + v (l)]+ρ
£
u
¡
s; θ
¢
+ v (s) + α [u (s; θ) + v (s)] + (1− α) [u (l; θ) + v (l)]
¤
,
(II.8)
subject to incentive compatibility constraints, which are given by
u (s; θ) + αv (s) + (1− α) v (l) ≤ u (l; θ) + v (l) , (II.9)
and
u
¡
l; θ
¢
+ v (l) ≤ u
¡
s; θ
¢
+ αv (s) + (1− α) v (l) . (II.10)
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Denoting optimal values with superscript R, the following can be stated about an optimal
agreement with commensurate but randomized retaliation:
Proposition 2 lR < sR and 0 < αR < 1.
Since αR is strictly less than 1, a safeguard-imposing country may face no retali-
ation. In fact, this random retaliation scheme that involves commensurate retaliation and
non-retaliation with positive probabilities, can be interpreted as less than-proportional re-
taliation against an initial oﬀense. Therefore, this proposition provides a similar intuition
as Proposition 1.
In the absence of a randomizing device, that is, when α is set equal to 1, a remedy
system that is based on the principle of reciprocity is similar to the GATT escape clause,
which prescribes commensurate retaliation against a violating country with certainty. On
the other hand, the WTO dispute settlement system can be interpreted as a public ran-
domizing device that authorizes commensurate retaliation with a probability less than one.
Therefore, this proposition suggests that the dispute settlement system of the World Trade
Organization can improve the value of trade agreements by reducing the rate of retaliation.
Fairness and the balance of concessions
Under the politically optimal trade agreement characterized in Proposition 1, an
exporting country that is adversely aﬀected by a safeguard measure will not be fully com-
pensated for its loss. Therefore, the “liability rule” that requires a breaching party to make
the breached-upon party whole, is not an optimal remedy scheme for the breach of trade
agreements. In fact, as pointed out by Bagwell (2007), in order for the injured country to
remain whole, it should be allowed to retaliate more than proportionately against an of-
fending country. This is shown graphically in Figure 3. Remember that point A represents
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the optimal tariﬀs pair when both countries face low political pressure. When there is a
high political pressure in the home country, the tariﬀ pair that maximizes the joint welfare
while leaves the foreign (that is, the aﬀected exporting country) whole is given by point
E at which the foreign country’s welfare contour through A is tangent to the joint-welfare
contour. At point E, which is located above the 45-degree line, the oﬀending country’s
tariﬀ is smaller than the injured country’s retaliatory tariﬀ. Therefore retaliation is more
than proportional at point E. In contrast, the optimal tariﬀ pair is given by point C at
which retaliation is less than proportional and the injured country is worse oﬀ compared to
its initial situations at point A.
The above discussion shows that when governments face diﬀerent political pres-
sures, an optimal tariﬀ schedule violates the balance of concessions between the parties.
Nevertheless, ex ante, that is, when political pressures are not yet realized, the expected
value of the agreement is the same to both governments. Therefore, the governments main-
tain a balance of concessions ex ante, although such a balance may not materialize ex post.
Moreover, in a changing environment where political pressures are swinging over
time, a country that is aﬀected by a safeguard measure in one period may turn out to be a
safeguard-imposing country in another period. Therefore, while a country may stand to lose
from an optimal remedy system in some periods, it would be overcompensated in periods
when it finds it optimal to violate its obligations in response to domestic pressures. In other
words, governments can maintain an intertemporal balance of concessions under an optimal
trade agreement even though an instantaneous balance is not maintained.
It is, however, important to note that an optimal agreement results in an intertem-
poral balance of concessions only if countries are symmetric in size and political environment.
For example, consider an extreme case where the foreign country never faces high political
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pressure while the home country faces high pressure with probability ρ ∈ (0, 1). An optimal
agreement for this pair of countries will be exactly the same as the agreement derived in
Section 3. Nevertheless, by signing such an agreement, the foreign country is giving more
concessions to the home country than it receives. Therefore, if negotiations follow a reci-
procity norm (even in an intertemporal or ex ante sense), governments with asymmetric
political environments would fail to achieve an optimal agreement if side payments are not
available. In practice, however, a major trade agreement may be reached in conjunction
with a few side agreements. These side agreements may be more favorable to the party
who stands to gain less from the trade agreement so that an overall balance of concessions
is achieved between the two parties.
Conclusion
This paper is the first to show that an optimal remedy system in the WTO consti-
tutes a less-than-proportional retaliation scheme against an oﬀending country. This remedy
system implies that the injured parties are not fully compensated for their loss. This is in
contrast to the findings of the contract theory literature regarding optimal remedies in do-
mestic settings. In particular, I show that a liability rule does not result in the most eﬃcient
remedy system. The analysis of this paper, therefore, indicates discords with the proposals
to allow for more-than-proportional retaliation against a violating country in the WTO.
The main result of this paper hinges on the assumption that governments are
unable to transfer cash between themselves as a method of compensation, and as a result
an injured country may receive compensation only by imposing tariﬀs on the imports from
the violating country. This assumption implies that a) compensating an injured country is
eﬃciency-reducing and b) a compensation award smaller than the initial harm is suﬃcient
21
to induce a government to reveal truthfully its private political pressures.
Under a politically optimal agreement, governments maintain an intertemporal
balance of concessions if they are symmetric in size and political environment. If one gov-
ernment is faced more frequently with high political pressure its gain is relatively higher
from a politically optimal agreement and a balance of concession is not maintained be-
tween the two countries. An interesting extension to this paper would be to impose an
intertemporal reciprocity constraint in the negotiators’ problem when countries are politi-
cally asymmetric, that is, when the probability of a high political pressure is diﬀerent across
countries. A similar analysis when countries are asymmetric in size will be interesting as
well.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. The Lagrangian of the maximization problem is as
follows
L = 2 (1− ρ) [u (l; θ) + v (l)]
+ρ
£
u
¡
s; θ
¢
+ v (s) + u (r; θ) + v (r)
¤
−λ1 [u (s; θ) + v (r)− u (l; θ)− v (l)]
−λ2
£
u
¡
l; θ
¢
+ v (l)− u
¡
s; θ
¢
− v (r)
¤
First-order necessary conditions for optimality are:
∂L
∂l
= [2 (1− ρ) + (λ1 − λ2)]
£
u0 (l; θ) + v0 (l)
¤
= 0
∂L
∂s
= ρ
£
u0
¡
s; θ
¢
+ v0 (s)
¤
− (λ1 − λ2)u0 (s; θ) = 0
∂L
∂r
= ρ
£
u0 (r; θ) + v0 (r)
¤
− (λ1 − λ2) v0 (r) = 0
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u (s; θ) + v (r) ≤ u (l; θ) + v (l) ,
u
¡
l; θ
¢
+ v (l) ≤ u
¡
s; θ
¢
+ v (r) .
λ1 ≥ 0
λ2 ≥ 0
λ1 [u (s; θ) + v (r)− u (l; θ)− v (l)] = 0
λ2
£
u
¡
l; θ
¢
+ v (l)− u
¡
s; θ
¢
− v (r)
¤
= 0
First, remember that the unconstrained maximization yields optimal values that do not
satisfy the constraints of the problem and, hence, we cannot have λ1 = λ2 = 0. Moreover,
at most one of the constraints is binding and we cannot have λ1, λ2 > 0. In what follows I
consider the remaining cases, which are (λ1 > 0, λ2 = 0) and (λ1 = 0, λ2 > 0)
Case 1: λ1 > 0, λ2 = 0
u (s; θ) + v (r) = u (l; θ) + v (l) (II.11)
∂L
∂l
= [2 (1− ρ) + λ1]
£
u0 (l; θ) + v0 (l)
¤
= 0 (II.12)
∂L
∂s
= −λ1u0 (s; θ) + ρu0
¡
s; θ
¢
+ ρv0 (s) = 0 (II.13)
∂L
∂r
= ρ
£
u0 (r; θ) + v0 (r)
¤
− λ1v0 (r) = 0. (II.14)
Condition (II.12) implies that:
u0 (l; θ) + v0 (l) = 0.
That is lOptimal = τPE (θ). Moreover, condition (II.13) implies that u0
¡
s; θ
¢
+ ρv0 (s) is
strictly positive, which in turn, implies that sOptimal < τPE
¡
θ
¢
. Condition (II.14) implies
that u0 (r; θ) + v0 (r) < 0, which in turn implies that rOptimal > τPE (θ), or rOptimal >
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lOptimal.
To complete the proof, I need to show that sOptimal > rOptimal. On the con-
trary, suppose that sOptimal = rOptimal or sOptimal < rOptimal. If sOptimal = rOptimal then,
given that lOptimal = τPE (θ) and u (τ ; θ) + v (τ) is concave with its peak at τPE (θ) , we
have lOptimal = sOptimal = rOptimal. Substituting lOptimal for r in (II.14) and noting that
u0
¡
lOptimal; θ
¢
+ v0
¡
lOptimal
¢
= 0 implies that This result implies that λ1 = 0, which is in
contradiction with the assumption that λ1 6= 0. On the other hand, if sOptimal < rOptimal.
then v
¡
sOptimal
¢
> v
¡
rOptimal
¢
. Therefore, we can substitute rOptimal for sOptimal in the
following inequality that holds because lOptimal maximizes u (τ ; θ) + v (τ) :
u
³
sOptimal; θ
´
+ v
³
sOptimal
´
< u
³
lOptimal; θ
´
+ v
³
lOptimal
´
.
In other words,
u
³
sOptimal; θ
´
+ v
³
rOptimal
´
< u
³
lOptimal; θ
´
+ v
³
lOptimal
´
.
This inequality is in contradiction with condition (II.11). Therefore, sOptimal > rOptimal.
Case 2: λ1 = 0, λ2 > 0
This case is not possible since the relevant first-order conditions imply that λ2 < 0.
The first-order conditions for this case are as follows:
u
¡
l; θ
¢
+ v (l) = u
¡
s; θ
¢
+ v (r) (II.15)
∂L
∂l
= 2 (1− ρ)
£
u0 (l; θ) + v0 (l)
¤
− λ2
£
u0
¡
l; θ
¢
+ v0 (l)
¤
= 0 (II.16)
∂L
∂s
= ρ
£
u0
¡
s; θ
¢
+ v0 (s)
¤
+ λ2u0
¡
s; θ
¢
= 0 (II.17)
∂L
∂r
= ρ
£
u0 (r; θ) + v0 (r)
¤
+ λ2v0 (r) = 0 (II.18)
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From conditions (II.17) and (II.18) we have
−u
0 (r; θ) + v0 (r)
u0
¡
s; θ
¢
+ v0 (s)
= − v
0 (r)
u0
¡
s; θ
¢ .
The left-hand side of this equation is the slope of the joint-welfare contours that are ellipses
centered at
¡
τPE (θ) , τPE
¡
θ
¢¢
, and the right-hand side is the slope of the home country’s
welfare contours when it faces high political pressure. If λ2 > 0, then (II.17) implies that
u0
¡
s; θ
¢
+v0 (s) < 0, or sOptimal > τPE
¡
θ
¢
. Similarly, (II.18) implies that u0 (r; θ)+v0 (r) >
0, or rOptimal < τPE (θ). Therefore, the slope of the home country’s welfare contour under
high pressure is positive. Moreover, this welfare contour goes through roptimal < τPE (θ)
and τPE
¡
θ
¢
< soptimal < τN
¡
θ
¢
. Therefore, the home country’s welfare contour that goes
through the optimal point does not cross the 45-degree line. This means that the first-order
condition (II.15) does not hold. Therefore, λ2 < 0.
Proof of proposition 2. I first show that s ≥ l. On the contrary assume that
s < l. Since u (τ ; θ) + αv (τ) is a quadratic function of τ , conditions (II.9) and (II.10)
can be written, respectively, as s+l2 ≤ m (θ;α) and
s+l
2 ≥ m
¡
θ;α
¢
, where, m (θ, α) =
argmax
τ
u (τ ; θ) + αv (τ). Now since m (θ, α) is increasing in θ, and θ < θ, we have
s+ l
2
≤ m (θ;α) < m
¡
θ;α
¢
≤ s+ l
2
,
or s+l2 <
s+l
2 , which is not possible. Hence s ≥ l.
The maximization problem in the Lagrangian form is given as follows
L = [2− ρ (1 + α)] [u (l; θ) + v (l)] + ρ £u ¡s; θ¢+ v (s)¤+ αρ [u (s; θ) + v (s)](II.19)
−λ1 [u (s; θ) + αv (s)− u (l; θ)− αv (l)]
−λ2
£
u
¡
l; θ
¢
+ αv (l)− u
¡
s; θ
¢
− αv (s)
¤
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Case 1: λ1 > 0 and λ2 = 0
The first-order conditions:
δL
δl
= [2− ρ (1 + α)]
£
u0 (l; θ) + v0 (l)
¤
+ λ1
£
u0 (l; θ) + αv0 (l)
¤
= 0, (II.20)
δL
δs
= ρ
£
u0
¡
s; θ
¢
+ v0 (s)
¤
+ αρ
£
u0 (s; θ) + v0 (s)
¤
− λ1
£
u0 (s; θ) + αv0 (s)
¤
= 0, (II.21)
δL
δα
= −ρ [u (l; θ) + v (l)] + ρ [u (s; θ) + v (s)]− λ1 [v (s)− v (l)] = 0, (II.22)
δL
δλ1
= u (s; θ) + αv (s)− u (l; θ)− αv (l) = 0. (II.23)
Condition (II.23) implies
α =
u (s; θ)− u (l; θ)
v (l)− v (s) .
Condition (II.22) implies
λ1 = ρ
[u (l; θ) + v (l)]− [u (s; θ) + v (s)]
v (l)− v (s)
= ρ
µ
1− u (s; θ)− u (l; θ)
v (l)− v (s)
¶
= ρ (1− α)
Substituting α and λ1 into (II.20) yields:
δL
δl
= [2− ρ (1 + α)]
£
u0 (l; θ) + v0 (l)
¤
+ ρ (1− α)
£
u0 (l; θ) + αv0 (l)
¤
= 0
or, equivalently,
1
2 (1− αρ)
δL
δl
= u0 (l; θ) +
³
2− (1 + α)2 ρ
´
2 (1− αρ) v
0 (l) = 0 (II.24)
Since 0 < 2−(1+α)
2ρ
2(1−αρ) < 1, we have l > τ
PE (θ).
As was shown above, in optimum we have s ≥ l. Here, I show that in optimum s is
strictly greater than l. On the contrary, suppose that l = s. Since l > τPE (θ), the derivative
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of the objective function with respect to l is negative. Moreover, when l = s, by reducing
l marginally, both incentive compatibility constraints will be still satisfied. Therefore, the
optimal solution must involve l < s.
Since s > l > τPE (θ), we have
u (l; θ) + v (l) > u (s; θ) + v (s)
which implies that
α =
u (s; θ)− u (l; θ)
v (l)− v (s) < 1.
Case 2: λ1 = 0, λ2 > 0
First-order conditions:
∂L
∂l
= [2− ρ (1 + α)]
£
u0 (l; θ) + v0 (l)
¤
− λ2
£
u0
¡
l; θ
¢
+ αv0 (l)
¤
= 0 (II.25)
∂L
∂s
= ρ
£
u0
¡
s; θ
¢
+ v0 (s)
¤
+ αρ
£
u0 (s; θ) + v0 (s)
¤
+ λ2
£
u0
¡
s; θ
¢
+ αv0 (s)
¤
= 0 (II.26)
∂L
∂λ2
= −
£
u
¡
l; θ
¢
+ αv (l)− u
¡
s; θ
¢
− αv (s)
¤
= 0 (II.27)
∂L
∂α
= −ρ [u (l; θ) + v (l)] + ρ [u (s; θ) + v (s)]− λ2 [v (l)− v (s)] = 0 (II.28)
Condition (II.27) implies
α =
u (s; θ)− u (l; θ)
v (l)− v (s)
Condition (II.28) implies
λ2 = −ρ
µ
1− u (s; θ)− u (l; θ)
v (l)− v (s)
¶
Therefore, we either have λ2 < 0 or α ≥ 1. If α ≥ 1, we have a corner solution in which
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α = 1 and λ2 = 0, and the relevant conditions for optimality are
∂L
∂l
= 2 (1− ρ)
£
u0 (l; θ) + v0 (l)
¤
= 0 (II.29)
∂L
∂s
= ρ
£
u0
¡
s; θ
¢
+ v0 (s)
¤
+ ρ
£
u0 (s; θ) + v0 (s)
¤
= 0 (II.30)
∂L
∂λ2
= −
£
u
¡
l; θ
¢
+ v (l)− u
¡
s; θ
¢
− v (s)
¤
= 0 (II.31)
1
ρ
∂L
∂α
= [u (s; θ) + v (s)]− [u (l; θ) + v (l)] ≥ 0 (II.32)
Condition (II.29) implies l = τPE (θ). If l = τPE (θ), then the condition (II.32) implies
that s = l = τPE (θ). However, when s = τPE (θ), condition (II.30) is not satisfied. Thus,
λ2 < 0, and this solution is not optimal.
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CHAPTER III
TRADE SKIRMISHES AND SAFEGUARDS: A THEORY OF THE WTO DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT PROCESS
Introduction
The role of GATT and its successor, the WTO, in reducing trade barriers has been
widely accepted. The design of the WTO is mainly based on the GATT agreement but it
also features significant reforms in some of the fundamental GATT principles. Despite the
important changes brought about by the WTO, however, economists have widely focused
their attention on the old GATT rules to provide an economic theory of the international
trading system. My purpose in this paper is to incorporate new features brought about by
the WTO into an economic analysis of this institution.
Bagwell and Staiger (1999, 2002) have introduced a unified framework for economic
analysis of GATT. They note that when a government imposes import tariﬀs, some of the
cost of this policy is shifted to foreign exporters, whose products sell at less favorable
terms of trade. Therefore governments face a Prisoners’ Dilemma when they set their
tariﬀ policies unilaterally. Bagwell and Staiger interpret the principles of reciprocity and
nondiscrimination as “pillars” of GATT that have assisted governments to escape a terms-
of-trade-driven Prisoners’ Dilemma. According to the reciprocity principle, if a country
decides to increase its tariﬀs above the previously bound levels, other countries will be
free to retaliate by increasing their respective tariﬀs proportionately. Bagwell and Staiger
show that conformity to this principle eliminates the governments’ ability to aﬀect terms
of trade through trade policy manipulations. Under the WTO, however, this principle has
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been weakened, such that a country can increase its tariﬀs under certain conditions without
facing retaliation from aﬀected countries. The governments are therefore able to alter their
terms of trade under the WTO, and one can characterize the principle of reciprocity as the
WTO’s “weakening” pillar.
A second notable change in GATT in its transition to the WTO has been the
strengthening of the Dispute Settlement Process (DSP). International trade relations have
become much more legalized under the WTO than under GATT. Dispute settlement under
GATT was a diplomatic process for the negotiation and rebalancing of reciprocal state-
to-state trade concessions (Shaﬀer 2003.) In contrast, the DSP under the WTO is quite
similar to a domestic legal system in that it involves a dispute panel that acts as a court of
law and an Appellate Body that reviews the rulings of the panel. This “legalization” of the
WTO is puzzling since the WTO members are sovereign governments that are not bound
to international law, and to the rulings of the WTO dispute panels for that matter.
Trade agreements under GATT and the WTO are subject to an escape clause. An
escape clause allows a country to abandon its obligations under the agreement if some of
its domestic industries are injured substantially because of a surge in imports.1 The use of
this clause was regulated under the GATT Article XIX, which was replaced by the Agree-
ment on Safeguards after the establishment of the WTO. Consistent with the reciprocity
principle, Article XIX stated that a GATT signatory who sought protection in the form
of safeguards, was subject to commensurate retaliation by the aﬀected countries. Under
the new Agreement on Safeguards, however, it is possible for a country to use the escape
clause for a period of three years without facing retaliation from the aﬀected countries.
This loosening of the safeguard discipline warrants explanation since a country that bears
1This policy is intended to safeguard the endangered industries against a sudden disruption in their
operation, which is thought to be needed for a smooth structural transition of the economy.
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no cost by invoking the escape clause has the incentive to exaggerate its need for increased
protection in order to improve its terms of trade.
In this paper, I provide a model of the WTO Dispute Settlement Process and
apply it to the Agreement on Safeguards. I consider state-contingent and self-enforcing
agreements when parties have asymmetric information about the prevailing contingency.
The DSP is modeled as an impartial arbitrator that investigates the state of the world and
issues a non-binding ruling about the culpability of the safeguard-imposing country, that is,
whether the situation in the defending country justifies a safeguard measure. I assume that
the dispute panel cannot observe the state of the world perfectly and its judgment may be
wrong. Nevertheless, the panel’s ruling is correlated with the true state of the world and,
thus, provides a public signal that the parties can use to coordinate their strategies. In
contrast, there is no such public signal available under GATT.
Including an escape clause in an agreement is an attempt towards writing a contin-
gent, or a more complete, contract that specifies diﬀerent actions for diﬀerent states of the
world. In order to implement such contingent agreements successfully, the prevailing state
of the world in the implementation stage must be identifiable to the negotiating parties.
In practice, however, it is more likely that the negotiating parties have private information
about the state of the world. Therefore, the prevailing contingency cannot be identified
publicly unless it is in the best interest of the relevant parties to disclose their private
information truthfully.
Following Bagwell and Staiger (2005), I use a simple political trade model with
private political shocks to show that the reciprocity principle embodied in the GATT Article
XIX can ensure truthful revelation of private information. Based on the reciprocity princi-
ple, if a government invokes the escape clause in response to domestic political pressures,
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the aﬀected negotiating parties will be free to withdraw equivalent concessions immedi-
ately, so that an instantaneous balance of concession is maintained among parties at all
time. Therefore, even though GATT has been instrumental in ending the pre-GATT trade
wars, in periods of high political pressure in one country, it prescribes a small-scale trade
war, or “trade skirmish”, in order to keep the incentives of the negotiating parties in check.
The threat of a trade skirmish following the invocation of the escape clause induces the gov-
ernments to use the clause only when they are faced with intense protectionist pressures.2
Therefore, all else equal, eliminating the requirement of instantaneous reciprocity should
lead to a failure of the agreement. Based on a similar reasoning, Bagwell and Staiger (2005,
p. 502) note that their analysis “indicates some discord –or at least reason for caution–
with the WTO’s elimination of the compensation and retaliation provisions associated with
escape clause actions. . . ”3
However, in this paper I show that if an impartial entity, such as the WTO dispute
panel, provides the trading partners with reliable (but not necessarily perfect) judgments
about the state of the cooperation, they can coordinate on an incentive-compatible strategy
profile that does not require an “instantaneous” balance of concessions.4 In my model, an
impartial arbitrator investigates the state of the world in the defending country and an-
nounces its opinion on the legitimacy of the defendant’s safeguard action. The judgment
of the impartial arbitrator provides a new piece of information that can mitigate the infor-
2Feenstra and Lewis (1991) also interpret trade skirmishes as a revelation mechanism in a cooperative
environment. Bagwell and Staiger (1990) study trade agreements in a non-cooperative but full-information
environment where a trade skirmish in periods of high trade volume is required to hold the parties’ incentive
to defect in check. My model captures both roles of trade skirmishes as I study trade agreements under a
non-cooperative and imperfect information environment.
3Bagwell and Staiger point out that the Agreement on Safeguards imposes a dynamic constraint on the
use of the escape clause. They introduce a model in which if a government uses the escape clause in this
period, then it must wait a period before it can use the escape clause again. They demonstrate that this
sort of constraint, which is a way to introduce a cost to invoking the escape clause, can work to address the
incentive-compatibility problem.
4Although the concessions are no longer in balance instantaneously, an “intertemporal” balance of con-
cessions is still maintained.
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mation asymmetry among the negotiating parties. Private investigations by the disputing
parties cannot generate the same public signal since the parties may act strategically in
disclosing their findings. In contrast, the arbitrators have the proper incentive to disclose
their findings truthfully, since they are impartial entities whose judgment does not aﬀect
their payoﬀs.
A reduction in information asymmetry makes the truth-telling constraints less
stringent and, as a result, a milder punishment for imposing a safeguard will be enough to
induce parties to reveal their private information truthfully. In particular, I show that the
parties can negotiate an incentive-compatible agreement that limits retaliation against a
safeguard-imposing country to cases where the dispute panel has dismissed the legitimacy
of the safeguard measure. This analysis implies that the DSP plays a central role in main-
taining the incentive compatibility of state-contingent agreements. It is therefore fair to
call the DSP the “third pillar” of the WTO that has been erected to support its weakening
pillar, i.e., the principle of reciprocity.
This paper can be viewed in the tradition of the economic theory of contract reme-
dies. One tenet in this literature is that an enforcement system should encourage eﬃcient
breach, that is, the breach of a contract in situations where “the promisor is able to profit
from his default after placing his promisee in as good a position as he would have occupied
had performance been rendered” (Birmingham 1970.) A mechanism that is used by domes-
tic courts to facilitate eﬃcient breach is called the liability rule. Under this rule, a party to
a contract is allowed to abandon its obligation if it compensates the breached-upon party
for its loss from non-compliance. As Schwartz and Sykes (2002) explain, the reciprocity
principle can be interpreted as a liability rule to encourage eﬃcient breach of trade agree-
ments, since this principle is eﬀectively a mechanism to compensate the aﬀected countries
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for their loss due to noncompliance. In business and civil disputes, however, compensation
is in monetary terms, while compensation is transferred through policy adjustments such
as withdrawal of equivalent concessions in disputes among trading partners. In contrast to
monetary transfers, which have no eﬃciency consequences, withdrawal of equivalent con-
cessions is distortionary and further reduces the aggregate welfare of the disputing parties.
Therefore, for the sake of eﬃciency, trading partners are interested in curbing the size of
compensation as long as they can maintain the incentive-compatibility of their agreement.
In fact, as emphasized above, under the WTO Agreement on Safeguards no such compen-
sation is necessarily aﬀorded. This paper suggests that the WTO has developed a new
contract remedy scheme that reflects the fact that compensating a breached-upon party in
trade disputes usually requires an eﬃciency-reducing trade skirmish.
I analyze the welfare eﬀect of the transition from GATT to the WTO in terms of
political welfare (defined as a weighted sum of all constituencies’ welfare, where a larger
weight is given to the welfare of the organized political lobby groups) as well as social
welfare (defined as a simple sum of all constituencies’ welfare). The welfare eﬀect can be
broken down into three parts. First, there are fewer trade skirmishes under the WTO,
which is an eﬃciency gain by itself. Second, the set of tariﬀs negotiated under the WTO
is diﬀerent from those negotiated under GATT. However, tariﬀs under the WTO are not
necessarily more eﬃcient than tariﬀs under GATT. In fact when the public signal generated
by the dispute panel is too noisy, the WTO tariﬀs are less eﬃcient than the GATT tariﬀs.
There is a critical level of the panel judgment quality below which the eﬃciency loss due
to less eﬃcient tariﬀs under the WTO outweighs the eﬃciency gain due to the lower rate
of trade skirmishes. Therefore, GATT becomes superior to the WTO in terms of political
welfare when the DSP cannot generate high-quality judgments. The third possible change
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in welfare is due to diﬀerences in enforcement capabilities across institutions, which will be
discussed below.
I study the enforcement of trade agreements in a repeated-game framework. I
show that if the governments are suﬃciently patient, then the self-enforcing constraint is
not binding. However, an important result is that the minimum patience (i.e., discount
factor) needed to satisfy the self-enforcing constraint is lower under the WTO than under
GATT. In other words, in comparison with GATT, the WTO’s self-enforcing constraint is
nonbinding for a larger set of discount factors. This analysis therefore suggests that, despite
having no teeth, the dispute panels of the WTO can improve the enforceability of trade
agreements. Moreover, the improved enforcement capability introduces a third channel
for welfare gain. Consider the range of discount factors under which the self-enforcing
constraint is binding under GATT but not under the WTO. For this range of discount
factors, satisfying the self-enforcing constraint under GATT requires a further deviation
from eﬃcient tariﬀs, which can be avoided by an institutional transition to the WTO with
a suﬃciently reliable quasi-legal system.
As an extension to the main model, I consider the situations where the court
behaves strategically to improve the expected political welfare of the member countries.
I characterize the optimal behavior of a“strategic” court and conclude that the member
countries will, in fact, benefit from a systematic bias towards protectionism if the court is
suﬃciently accurate. In other words, a suﬃciently accurate court can improve the parties’
expected welfare by ruling pro-defendant more frequently. In contrast, a systematic bias
towards free trade is desired when the court is not suﬃciently accurate.
Some scholars have interpreted the loosening of the safeguard discipline as an at-
tempt to divert protectionist policies from relying heavily on antidumping measures and
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Figure 4. The use of the safeguard measure over time. (Source: The World Bank and the
WTO.)
Voluntary Export Restraints (VERs) towards safeguard measures. In fact, the use of safe-
guard measures has been on the rise under the WTO (Figure 4) even though these mea-
sures still remains relatively unpopular compared to antidumping measures. Economists
typically prefer that a country resort to safeguard measures, which are consistent with the
Most-Favored Nation (MFN) principle, in lieu of antidumping measures that discriminate
among foreign exporters (Bown 2002). Moreover, the use of VERs is criticized as lacking
transparency and enabling international cartels with the help of governments (Rosendorﬀ
1996).5 This paper takes a diﬀerent approach to explain the virtues of the reforms in
the escape clause by demonstrating the potential eﬃciency gains resulting from the new
Agreement on Safeguards.
A number of studies have explored the informational role of the WTO. Furusawa
5For example, in the case of Japan’s voluntary restriction on steel exports to the United State, the
Consumers’ Union of the United States filed a lawsuit against the US government and Japanese and US
steel makers, claiming that there was a conspiracy to divide the US and Japanese markets that violated the
Sherman Act (Matsushita et al, 2003, p. 215).
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(2003) models the WTO as an entity that can observe perfectly the true state of the world
in the defending country, while the complainant receives only a noisy signal about it. In his
model, obtaining the court’s opinion is costly and, therefore, a contracting party initiates
a formal dispute only if it receives a signal indicating a high probability of deviation by
another member. My model diﬀers since I assume that the DSP is faced with similar
information barriers as the uninformed party in a dispute.
Rosendorﬀ (2005) studies the escape clause in trade agreements, assuming that a
dispute panel rules against the defendant with a fixed and publicly known probability that
is not correlated with the true state of the world. Finally, in Maggi (1999), the role of
the WTO is to disseminate information on deviations in order to facilitate “multilateral”
punishments. Multilateral punishment is particularly helpful when a complaining country
does not have the capacity to retaliate against the deviating country.
The model of non-binding arbitration under asymmetric information developed
here can also shed light on the role of non-binding arbitration in other contexts. One such
context is a business relationship where, instead of pursuing a dispute in a court of law,
independent agents may rely on non-binding arbitration by an impartial third party to
settle their disputes.
After characterizing the economic environment under which trade agreements are
implemented in the next section, I will find the incentive-compatible agreement that max-
imizes political welfare under the GATT escape clause. Then I introduce a model of DSP
and find the incentive-compatible agreement that maximizes political welfare under the
Agreement on Safeguards. Using these models, I compare political and social welfare across
the two institutions. To address the issue of enforcement, I employ a repeated-game frame-
work to determine the conditions under which trade agreements are self-enforcing. Finally,
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I introduce extensions to the main model by considering the behavior of courts who pursue
specific objectives. Proofs are provided in the Appendix.
The Model
The Economic Environment
Consider a pair of distinct goods x and y with demand functions in the home
country (no *) and the foreign country (*) given by:
Dx (px) = 1− px, Dy (py) = 1− py, (III.1)
D∗x (p
∗
x) = 1− p∗x, D∗y
¡
p∗y
¢
= 1− p∗y,
where p (with the appropriate index) represents the price of a good in a certain country.
Specific import tariﬀs, τ and τ∗, chosen by countries as the only trade policy instrument,
create a gap between domestic and foreign prices. In particular, px = p∗x+τ and py = p∗y−τ∗.
Both countries produce both goods using the following supply functions:
Qx (px) = px, Qy (py) = bpy, (III.2)
Q∗x (p
∗
x) = bp
∗
x, Q
∗
y
¡
p∗y
¢
= p∗y.
Assuming b > 1, the home country will be a natural importer of x and a natural exporter
of y.
For reasons that will be clear later, I assume that there is another pair of goods
which countries produce and consume in an identical manner as above. Finally, there is a
numeraire good, z, which is abundant in each country and is used either as a consumption
good or as an input to the production of other goods.
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Under this model, the market-clearing price of x (y) depends only on the home
(foreign) tariﬀ. Let px (τ) and py (τ∗) respectively denote the equilibrium prices of x and y
in the home country. If import tariﬀs are non-prohibitive (i.e., if they are suﬃciently small)
trade occurs between the countries and the home consumers’ surplus from the consumption
of x and y will be given by
ψx (τ) ≡
Z 1
px(τ)
Dx (u) du, ψy (τ
∗) ≡
Z 1
py(τ∗)
Dy (u) du.
Moreover, the home producers’ surplus from the sale of x and y will be given by
πx (τ) ≡
Z px(τ)
0
Qx (u) du, πy (τ∗) ≡
Z py(τ∗)
0
Qy (u) du.
The government’s tariﬀ revenue is given by
T (τ) ≡ τMx (px (τ)) ,
where Mx (px) ≡ Dx (px)−Qx (px), is the import demand for good x in the home country.
A Political Objective Function
Following Baldwin (1987), I assume that each government maximizes a weighted
sum of its producers’ surplus, consumers’ surplus, and tariﬀ revenues with a relatively higher
weight on the surplus of its import-competing sector. The higher weight given to the welfare
of a sector might be the result of political pressure, through lobbying for example, that a
government faces. Denoting the political weight on the welfare of the import-competing
sector in the home (foreign) country by θ (θ∗), where θ, θ∗ ≥ 1, I assume that the home
government’s welfare drawn from sector x as a function of the home import tariﬀ is given
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by
u (τ ; θ) ≡ ψx (τ) + θπx (τ) + T (τ) ,
and the home government’s welfare from sector y as a function of the foreign import tariﬀ
is given by
v (τ∗) ≡ ψy (τ∗) + πy (τ∗) .
Therefore, u (τ ; θ) + v (τ∗) represents the political welfare of the home government, which
is additively separable in functions of the home and foreign tariﬀs.
Lemma 1 u (τ ; θ) is a concave function of τ and is increasing for suﬃciently small τ . In
contrast, v (τ∗) is a convex function and is decreasing for suﬃciently small τ∗.
This Lemma implies that the home government’s welfare is increasing in the home
tariﬀ and decreasing in the foreign tariﬀ when these tariﬀs are suﬃciently low.
If the home government were to set its policies unilaterally, it would choose τ to
maximize u (τ ; θ) + v (τ∗). This is tantamount to choosing a tariﬀ rate that maximizes
the home government’s welfare from its import-competing sector, u (τ ; θ). Therefore, the
non-cooperative (Nash) tariﬀ as a function of political pressure is given by
τN (θ) ≡ argmax
τ
u (τ ; θ) . (III.3)
In setting its policy unilaterally, the home government ignores the impact of its
tariﬀ on the welfare of the foreign government which is captured by v (τ). Had governments
managed to set tariﬀs cooperatively, the politically-eﬃcient home tariﬀ, τPE, should maxi-
mize u (τ ; θ)+ v (τ), which is the joint payoﬀ of the home and foreign governments from an
import tariﬀ at home. Namely,
τPE (θ) = argmax
τ
u (τ ; θ) + v (τ) . (III.4)
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Lemma 2 τPE (θ) and τN (θ) are increasing in θ and τPE (θ) < τN (θ).
In the above analysis, I relied on the assumption that any tariﬀs that governments
may rationally choose are non-prohibitive. Since setting a tariﬀ higher than τN (θ) is not
individually rational, this assumption is satisfied if τN (θ) is not prohibitive. Denoting the
lowest prohibitive tariﬀ rate by τproh., the following assumption ensures that no prohibitive
tariﬀ will be chosen by any government:
Assumption 1. θ < θproh., where θproh. is defined by τN (θproh.) = τproh..6
If the governments were able to transfer cash as side payments between themselves,
they could achieve politically-eﬃcient tariﬀs through bilateral negotiations and split the
eﬃciency gains. However, a cash transfer is rarely observed under the GATT/WTO. That
may be because a cash transfer to foreign countries should be funded by raising domestic
taxes which are usually distortive and eﬃciency-reducing. In other words, even though
cash transfers can improve the eﬃciency of trade agreements, they cause ineﬃciency in the
domestic markets. This makes the governments hesitant about using cash transfers as part
of their trade agreements.
When side payments are not practical, countries with diﬀerent realizations of po-
litical pressure may fail to reach an eﬃcient agreement if they want to maintain a balance of
concessions. That is because a balance of concessions between symmetric countries requires
equal tariﬀs,7 while eﬃcient tariﬀs are not equal across countries when they experience
diﬀerent political pressures. In other words, if the home country increases its tariﬀ in re-
sponse to high political pressures, the foreign country will have to reciprocate by raising
6As shown in the Appendix, when the specific supply and demand functions introduced above are used,
this assumption reduces to θ < 3b−1b+1 .
7Two countries maintain a balance of concessions if, as a result of the exchange of concessions, the terms
of trade remains unaﬀected. Assuming that the reference terms of trade for a pair of symmetric countries is
1, governments have to set reciprocal tariﬀs in order to keep the terms of trade at its reference level.
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its respective tariﬀ in order to maintain an instantaneous balance of concessions. This re-
sembles the tariﬀ schedule suggested by the GATT escape clause (Article XIX) based on
which countries are supposed to maintain reciprocity in setting their tariﬀs at all times.
However, in a changing environment where political pressures are swinging over time, the
countries can maintain an intertemporal balance of concessions without requiring equal
tariﬀs across countries in each period. In particular, if θ and θ∗ are drawn independently
from the same distribution function, the countries can maintain an intertemporal balance of
concessions by negotiating fully-contingent and politically-eﬃcient tariﬀs, i.e., τ = τPE (θ)
and τ∗ = τPE (θ∗). Such a tariﬀ agreement is reminiscent of the Safeguard Agreement of
the WTO, which under certain conditions authorizes a country to raise its tariﬀs without
suﬀering retaliation from aﬀected countries.
Private Political Pressures, Monitoring, and Contingent Agreements
I assume that political pressures can take two levels, i.e., low and high, denoted
respectively by θ and θ. Remember that each country has two import-competing industries
which may exert political pressure in order to restrict imports of the like products. I assume
that these pressures are realized according to the following probability distribution:
Pr (high pressure from both industries) = 0,
Pr (high pressure from only one industry) = ρ,
Pr (no high pressure) = 1− ρ,
where, 0 < ρ < 1. This probability distribution ensures that in each country there is at
least one import-competing industry which exerts low political pressure. The availability
of such an industry will make the analysis of the retaliation provisions in trade agreements
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much simpler. I also maintain the following assumption throughout the paper.
Assumption 2. θ and θ are such that τPE
¡
θ
¢
< τN (θ).
This assumption ensures that if an agreement sets a tariﬀ binding equal to or
smaller than τPE
¡
θ
¢
, the governments will always choose the highest tariﬀ authorized
under the agreement.
I assume that the realization of θ (θ∗) is private information of the the home (for-
eign) government. Therefore, the agreement cannot be contingent on political pressures
unless the governments have the proper incentives to reveal their private information truth-
fully. Using the revelation principle, one might be able to design a mechanism that induces
governments to reveal truthfully the political pressure that they face at home. In particu-
lar, an agreement can be designed contingent upon the countries’ announcements regarding
their respective political pressure. In this paper, however, I am interested in analyzing the
best agreements that can be written under two alternative institutional settings, namely,
GATT and the WTO. Therefore, I will take the rules under these institutions as given and
solve for the best incentive-compatible agreement under each institution.
Even though domestic political pressures are private information of the govern-
ment, outsiders (e.g., other governments and WTO arbitrators) can obtain a noisy signal
about it by investigating the state of the world in the country. If the signal that outsiders
receive is publicly observable and suﬃciently informative, then a contract contingent upon
the signal could provide some eﬃciency improvement over a non-contingent contract that
ignores the signal. However, political pressure is a subjective concept that is hard to quan-
tify using a verifiable measure. In fact, diﬀerent parties may reach diﬀerent conclusions (i.e.,
observe diﬀerent signals) regarding the true state of the world, while their conclusions are
their respective private information. While the negotiating parties would act strategically in
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The regime (GATT or WTO)
is determined
Governments negotiate a two-step 
tariff schedule (l,s)
States of the world (i.e., political pressures) are realized 
and each government learns its own state privately
Governments make reports about their state of the world
The WTO makes an announcement about the 
state of the world in the defending country
Governments apply tariffs and obtain their payoffs
If regim
e is G
ATT
Figure 5. The sequence of events under the GATT and the WTO.
revealing their private information, an impartial third-party, by definition, has no incentive
to distort the truth. Thus, an impartial arbitrator will be able to provide a public signal
that can be used, along with the parties’ announcements, to write a contingent agreement.
The sequence of events is depicted in Figure (5). After adopting a regime (i.e.,
GATT or WTO), the governments negotiate a two-step tariﬀ schedule (l, s), where l <
s. The governments are supposed to adopt the negotiated low tariﬀ, l, for their low-
pressure industries, and to use the negotiated safeguard tariﬀ, s, for their high-pressure
industries. Each country privately observes its domestic state of the world and makes a
public announcement about it, denoted by bθ and bθ∗ where bθ,bθ∗ ∈ ©θ, θª. By announcing
high political pressure, a government claims that one (and only one) of its import-competing
industries is exerting high pressure. Announcing low pressure, on the other hand, implies
that no import-competing industry is exerting high pressure. As will be seen in detail,
GATT and the WTO diﬀer in the way they regulate further steps. The tariﬀ agreement
under GATT is contingent on the reports of the governments about their respective state of
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the world. However, under the WTO, the tariﬀ agreement is contingent on the combination
of the governments’ and the WTO’s reports about the state of the world.
Trade Agreements under GATT: No Public Monitoring
According to the GATT escape clause (Article XIX), if any product is being im-
ported into the territory of a negotiating party in such increased quantities and under such
conditions as to cause or threaten serious injury to domestic producers in that territory,
the negotiating party will be free to suspend its obligation by putting in place protectionist
measures to help its endangered industry. In response, the aﬀected exporting countries
will be free to withdraw some of their previously-granted concessions in a way that is sub-
stantially equivalent to concessions withdrawn by the safeguard-imposing country. In other
words, the GATT escape clause requires the negotiating parties to maintain a balance of
concessions at each point in time.
I model the GATT escape clause as follows. If both governments announce low
political pressures they should choose l for all of their imports. If the home government
announces high political pressure, i.e., bθ = θ, it will impose the negotiated safeguard tariﬀ,
s, on the import of the good that according to the home government has resulted in high
political pressure. In response to the announcement bθ = θ, the foreign government will also
impose s on the imports of a good that is in competition with a low -pressure industry. Other
combinations can be obtained due to symmetry. Table (1) summarizes the strategy profile,
referred to as the GATT strategy profile, to be employed by the governments. In this table
the set of tariﬀs to be chosen by each government for each combination of announcements
is given.
If both countries announce their state of the world truthfully, the expected per-
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Table 1. GATT Strategy Profile
Foreign
θ θ
Home θ {s, s} , {s, s} {s, l} , {s, l}
θ {s, l} , {s, l} {l, l} , {l, l}
period payoﬀ to the home government is given by:
ρ2
©£
u
¡
s; θ
¢
+ u (s; θ)
¤
+ [v (s) + v (s)]
ª
(θ = θ∗ = θ)
+ (1− ρ)2 {[u (l; θ) + u (l; θ)] + [v (l) + v (l)]} (θ = θ∗ = θ)
+ (1− ρ) ρ
©£
u
¡
s; θ
¢
+ u (l; θ)
¤
+ [v (s) + v (l)]
ª
(θ = θ, θ∗ = θ)
+ (1− ρ) ρ {[u (s; θ) + u (l; θ)] + [v (s) + v (l)]} . (θ = θ, θ∗ = θ)
The expression on the first line above represents the welfare of the home government
(weighted by ρ2) when both countries are experiencing high political pressure, where ρ2
is the probability of this contingency. Under this contingency, both countries impose s on
all of their imports. As a result, the home government receives u
¡
s; θ
¢
+ u (s; θ) from its
importing sectors and v (s) + v (s) from its exporting sectors. Welfare under other contin-
gencies can be calculated similarly. Simplifying the above expression gives the expected
per-period welfare of a country under GATT as a function of the negotiated tariﬀs, l and s:
PG (l, s) = ρ
£
u
¡
s; θ
¢
+ v (s) + u (s; θ) + v (s)
¤
+ 2 (1− ρ) [u (l; θ) + v (l)] . (III.5)
PG (l, s) can be also interpreted as the expected joint welfare of the home and foreign
governments as a function of the home tariﬀs.
The best incentive-compatible negotiated agreement under the GATT rules will
be one that maximizes PG (l, s) subject to some incentive constraints that ensure truthful
revelation of private information by the negotiating parties. To construct the incentive
compatibility constraints, note that when a government is faced with low pressure, its
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expected payoﬀ from claiming low pressure is
u (l; θ) + v (l) + (1− ρ) [u (l; θ) + v (l)] + ρ [u (s; θ) + v (s)] ,
while its expected payoﬀ from lying is
u (s; θ) + v (s) + (1− ρ) [u (l; θ) + v (l)] + ρ [u (s; θ) + v (s)] .
Therefore, truth-telling requires
u (l; θ) + v (l) ≥ u (s; θ) + v (s) . (III.6)
Similarly, truthful revelation of high pressure is ensured if
u
¡
s; θ
¢
+ v (s) ≥ u
¡
l; θ
¢
+ v (l) . (III.7)
In short, the negotiators’ problem under GATT can be summarized as
max
l,s
PG (l, s) (III.8)
subject to incentive constraints (III.6) and (III.7) .
Ignoring the incentive constraints, the solution to the unconstrained maximization
of PG (l, s) can be written as
lG = argmax
l
[u (l; θ) + v (l)] ≡ τPE (θ) ,
sG = argmax
s
£
u
¡
s; θ
¢
+ v (s) + u (s; θ) + v (s)
¤
.
Also, it is straightforward to show that τPE (θ) < sG < τPE
¡
θ
¢
. Thus,
τPE (θ) = lG < sG < τPE
¡
θ
¢
. (III.9)
But (III.9) is also a suﬃcient condition for (III.6) and (III.7) to be satisfied. To see this,
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recall that according to Lemma 2, u (τ ; θ) + v (τ) is concave and attains its maximum at
τ = τPE (θ). This implies that (III.6) and (III.7) are satisfied as long as τPE (θ) ≤ l ≤
s ≤ τPE
¡
θ
¢
. Formally,
Proposition 3 The incentive compatibility constraints are not binding in the GATT nego-
tiators’ problem (III.8) , and the best incentive-compatible negotiated tariﬀ schedule under
GATT is given by
¡
lG, sG
¢
. Moreover, τPE (θ) = lG < sG < τPE
¡
θ
¢
.
The fact that these incentive constraints are not binding suggests that the GATT’s
instantaneous reciprocity principle is too restrictive as a mechanism for truthful revelation of
private information. In other words, a 100-percent probability of a trade skirmish following
the imposition of a safeguard measure is not necessary to ensure truth-telling. For example,
if the negotiating parties can make their actions contingent on the outcome of a public
randomizing device, they can improve their political welfare by choosing a probability of
retaliation that is only high enough to keep the incentive constraints satisfied. Such a
public randomizing device enables the negotiating parties to choose the right severity of
punishment — strong enough to ensure truth-telling, but not so strong that it causes excessive
occurrence of trade skirmishes. Reinhardt (2001) and Rosendorﬀ (2005) view international
trade institutions as public randomizing devices where retaliation against a deviating party
is authorized with a fixed probability.8
Modelling the WTO as a randomizing device ignores the ability of this institution
to investigate the disputed actions. By investigating a dispute case, an expert may obtain
valuable information regarding the true state of the world, which can be used to mitigate
the information asymmetry among the disputing parties. In the next Section, the WTO is
modeled as an impartial arbitrator that investigates a dispute case and truthfully reveals
its (possibly imperfect) findings about the state of the world (i.e., the culpability of the
8They also take this probability as exogenous and, therefore, they do not characterize the optimal ran-
domizing device.
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defendant). Similar to the case of a public randomizing device, the negotiating parties
make their post-dispute actions contingent on the arbitrator’s findings.
Trade Agreement under WTO: Public Monitoring Provided by DSP
In contrast to the GATT Article XIX, the Safeguard Agreement of the WTO does
not require a safeguard-imposing country to compensate the aﬀected exporting countries
if the surge in imports has caused or threatened serious injury to the domestic industries.
Obviously, if there is no consequence to imposing safeguards, all governments will have an
incentive to act opportunistically by claiming a bad shock to their respective economies.
However, to implement safeguard measures with impunity, a country has to prove that
its domestic situations meet the requirements set out in the agreement for a legitimate
safeguard. If a dispute arises among the parties on whether some prevailing situations
legitimize the use of safeguards by one country, a panel of experts appointed by the WTO
would issue its opinion on the prevailing state of the world. In this paper, I take the view
that the parties regard the panel’s opinion as a public signal which is correlated with the
true state of the world in the defending country. Letting eθ ∈ ©θ, θª (eθ∗ ∈ ©θ, θª) denote
the panel’s opinion about the state of the world in the home (foreign) country, I assume
that the panel can recognize the true state of the world in either country with probability
γ ∈ [0, 1], i.e.,
Pr
³eθ = θ|θ = θ´ = Pr³eθ = θ|θ = θ´ = γ.
If the home country announces high political pressure, i.e., bθ = θ, which also
indicates its intention to implement a safeguard measure on one of its imports, it should
defend its case before the dispute panel. The dispute panel investigates the truthfulness
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of the announcement and issues its opinion about the state of the world in the home (i.e.,
defending) country. If the panel upholds the defendant’s claim, that is, if eθ = bθ = θ,
then the complaining country is not authorized to retaliate against the defending country.
However, if the panel dismisses the defendant’s claim, the complaining country can retaliate
against the defending country by adopting a safeguard-level tariﬀ, s, on one of its imports
that is not currently eligible for a safeguard. The availability of such an importing good in
the complaining country is ensured by the assumption that in a given period, protectionist
pressures may be present in at most one of the two importing sectors.
Payoﬀs under WTO
In this subsection I calculate the expected payoﬀs of the home government (which
is equal to that of the foreign government due to symmetry), given that both countries
follow the strategy profile laid out above. First consider the case where both countries face
low political pressures, which happens with a probability of (1− ρ)2. In this situations both
countries set the negotiated low tariﬀ, l, on all imports, and the home government obtains
2 [u (l; θ) + v (l)].
With probability ρ (1− ρ) we have θ = θ, and θ∗ = θ. The panel will approve the
foreign country’s decision to implement safeguards with probability γ, in which case the
home country should choose low tariﬀs on all imports. With probability 1 − γ, the panel
will disapprove the foreign government’s decision, in which case the home government will
be authorized to retaliate by choosing s on one import. Therefore, the expected payoﬀ to
the home government (before the panel’s decision is announced) is given by:
[γu (l; θ) + (1− γ)u (s; θ) + v (s)] + [u (l; θ) + v (l)] .
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Similarly, the case where θ = θ and θ∗ = θ can happen with probability ρ (1− ρ), and the
payoﬀ to the home government will be:
£
u
¡
s; θ
¢
+ γv (l) + (1− γ) v (s)
¤
+ [u (l; θ) + v (l)] .
When both countries receive high pressure, which happens with probability ρ2, the payoﬀ
to the home government is:
γ2
©£
u
¡
s; θ
¢
+ v (s)
¤
+ [u (l; θ) + v (l)]
ª
+(1− γ)2
©£
u
¡
s; θ
¢
+ v (s)
¤
+ [u (s; θ) + v (s)]
ª
+γ (1− γ)
©£
u
¡
s; θ
¢
+ v (s)
¤
+ [u (s; θ) + v (l)]
ª
+γ (1− γ)
©£
u
¡
s; θ
¢
+ v (s)
¤
+ [u (l; θ) + v (s)]
ª
The expression on the first line above reflects the case where the panel makes a correct
judgment on both countries’ claims. The second line is for the case where the panel’s
judgments are both wrong. The third line represents the case where the panel approves the
home government’s claim but not that of the foreign government. The last line represents
the case where the panel approves the foreign government’s claim but not that of the home
government. Taking the expectation of these contingent payoﬀs (with respect to θ and
θ∗) and simplifying yields the ex ante expected payoﬀ of the home government (before the
realization of political pressures) as follows:
PW (l, s) = ρ
£
u
¡
s; θ
¢
+ v (s)
¤
+ρ (1− γ) [u (s; θ) + v (s)]+(2 (1− ρ) + ργ) [u (l; θ) + v (l)] .
(III.10)
Lemma 3 Denoting the solution to the unconstrained maximization of PW (l, s) by lWu
and sWu, we have lWu = τPE (θ) < sWu ≤ τPE
¡
θ
¢
. Moreover, sWu is an increasing
function of γ, which is equal to sG when γ = 0 and is equal to τPE
¡
θ
¢
when γ = 1.
51
Incentive constraints
In this subsection I lay out the home government’s incentive constraints assuming
that the foreign government tells the truth. Due to symmetry, the foreign government’s
incentive constraints will be identical to those of the home government.
When θ = θ, the home government’s payoﬀ from lying is [u (s; θ)+ γv (s)+
(1− γ) v (l)]. That is because by claiming a high shock, when it is actually low, the govern-
ment receives u (s; θ) from its protected sector, while it will face retaliation against one of its
exporting sectors with probability γ, resulting in an expected payoﬀ of γv (s)+ (1− γ) v (l)
from the exporting sector. By telling the truth, on the other hand, the government will
receive [u (l; θ) + v (l)]. Therefore, the incentive constraint under this contingency is
u (s; θ) + γv (s) + (1− γ) v (l) ≤ u (l; θ) + v (l) ,
or, equivalently
u (s; θ) + γv (s) ≤ u (l; θ) + γv (l) . (III.11)
When θ = θ, the government’s expected payoﬀ from invoking a safeguard measure
(i.e., claiming high pressure) is u
¡
s; θ
¢
+γv (l)+(1− γ) v (s), and its payoﬀ without invoking
a safeguard measure is u
¡
l, θ
¢
+ v (l). Therefore, the incentive constraint when θ = θ is
given by
u
¡
s; θ
¢
+ γv (l) + (1− γ) v (s) ≥ u
¡
l; θ
¢
+ v (l) ,
or, equivalently, by
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u
¡
s; θ
¢
+ (1− γ) v (s) ≥ u
¡
l; θ
¢
+ (1− γ) v (l) . (III.12)
In short, the negotiators’ problem under the WTO can be summarized as
max
l,s
PW (l, s) (III.13)
subject to incentive constraints (III.11) and (III.12) .
The following Lemma will be useful in analyzing these incentive constraints.
Lemma 4 Assuming that 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, u (τ ; θ) + αv (τ) is a concave function of τ and is
symmetric around τ = m (θ, α), where
m (θ, α) ≡ argmax
τ
[u (τ ; θ) + αv (τ)] .
Moreover, m (θ;α) is increasing in θ and decreasing in α.
The concave function u (τ ; θ)+αv (τ), is the general functional form of the expres-
sions on each side of the incentive constraints, such that in the incentive constraint (III.11)
we have α = γ and θ = θ, and in the incentive constraint (III.12) we have α = 1− γ and
θ = θ. Also the function m (θ, α) given in this Lemma can be used to rewrite the politically
eﬃcient tariﬀs as τPE (θ) = m (θ, 1) and τPE
¡
θ
¢
= m
¡
θ, 1
¢
.
It is now straightforward to show that the unconstrained optimal negotiated tariﬀs,
lWu and sWu, satisfy (III.12) and thus (III.12) is not a binding incentive constraint. To
see this, note that since m (θ, α) is increasing in θ and decreasing in α, we have
m (θ, 1) < m
¡
θ, 1
¢
< m
¡
θ, 1− γ
¢
,
or, equivalently,
τPE (θ) < τPE
¡
θ
¢
< m
¡
θ, 1− γ
¢
.
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Figure 6. The incentive constraint (III.12) is non-binding.
Now recall from Lemma 3 that lWu = τPE (θ) < sWu ≤ τPE
¡
θ
¢
, and rewrite the above
inequalities as follows:
lWu < sWu < m
¡
θ, 1− γ
¢
.
But since u
¡
τ , θ
¢
+(1− γ) v (τ) is a concave function that attains its maximum atm
¡
θ, 1− γ
¢
,
this inequality implies that:
u
¡
lWu; θ
¢
+ (1− γ) v
¡
lWu
¢
< u
¡
sWu; θ
¢
+ (1− γ) v
¡
sWu
¢
.
Therefore, the incentive constraint (III.12) is not binding. (See Figure 6 for a graphical
representation.)
Now consider the incentive constraint (III.11). Since lWu < sWu for all γ ∈ [0, 1],
and u (τ ; θ) + γv (τ) is concave and symmetric around m (θ, γ), the incentive constraint
(III.11) is non-binding if and only if
sWu + lWu ≥ 2m (θ, γ) .
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Figure 7. An example where the incentive constraint (III.11) is satisfied, i.e., when sWu ≥
2m (θ, γ)− lWu.
Figure 7 depicts a situation where this inequality, and hence, the incentive constraint
(III.11), is satisfied. This inequality is violated if γ = 0 (because lWu < sWu (γ = 0) <
m (θ, 0))9 and is satisfied if γ = 1 (because lWu = m (θ, 1) < sWu (γ = 1) = m
¡
θ, 1
¢
). More-
over, the left-hand side of this inequality is increasing in γ (Lemma 3) while its right-hand
side is decreasing in γ (Lemma 4). Therefore,
Lemma 5 There exists γ2 ∈ (0, 1) such that lWu and sWu are incentive compatible and
thus are optimal solutions to the WTO negotiators’ problem (III.13), if and only if γ ≥ γ2.
In other words, if the dispute panel’s judgment is suﬃciently accurate, i.e., if
γ > γ2, the incentive constraints are not binding. However, if γ < γ2, we have sWu <
2m (θ, γ) − lWu and the incentive constraint (III.11) is binding. The following Lemma
characterizes the optimal negotiated tariﬀs under the WTO when this incentive constraint
is binding.
Lemma 6 There exists γ1 ∈ (0, γ2) such that the optimal solution to the WTO negotiators’
problem (III.13) satisfies l + s = 2m (θ, γ) if γ1 ≤ γ ≤ γ2, and satisfies l = s if γ ≤ γ1.
Therefore, for very low qualities of judgment, i.e., when γ ≤ γ1, the optimal
9We know from Assumption 2 that τPE

θ

< τN (θ) and from Lemma 3 that sWu (γ) ≤ τPE

θ

.
Therefore, sWu (γ = 0) < m (θ, 0) = τN (θ) .
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solution to (III.13) is a non-contingent tariﬀ schedule, denoted by τnc. Letting
¡
lWr, sWr
¢
denote the optimal solution to (III.13) when γ1 < γ < γ2, the best incentive-compatible
tariﬀ schedule under the WTO for diﬀerent levels of γ can be summarized by
¡
lW , sW
¢
,
where
lW ≡
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
lWu if γ ≥ γ2
lWr if γ1 < γ < γ2
τnc if γ ≤ γ1
and sW ≡
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
sWu if γ ≥ γ2
sWr if γ1 < γ < γ2
τnc if γ ≤ γ1.
In the Appendix, it is shown that these tariﬀs can be ranked as follows:
Lemma 7 lWu < lWr < τN (θ) and sWu < sWr < τN
¡
θ
¢
.
That is, a binding incentive compatibility constraint results in higher agreement
tariﬀs, namely, lWr > lWu and sWr > sWu. In either case, the low and safeguard tariﬀs
under the WTO are less than the non-cooperative (Nash) tariﬀs.
Political Welfare under WTO vs. GATT
A potential source of political welfare improvement in transition from GATT to
the WTO is the reduced rate of trade skirmishes under the WTO. The frequency of trade
skirmishes under the WTO, 2ρ (1− γ), is less than its frequency under GATT, 2ρ. The
reduced rate of retaliations under the WTO can benefit the negotiating parties in two ways.
First, since retaliatory tariﬀs are less eﬃcient than normal tariﬀs, all else equal, fewer
invocations of retaliatory provisions will improve the welfare of the governments. In other
words, restrictions on the use of the retaliation provision under the WTO reduces the pain
to the governments from protecting their industries in periods of high political pressures.
Second, note that in setting safeguard tariﬀ rates, negotiators should take into account
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the ineﬃciency created by retaliations against the safeguard-imposing country. In fact, the
prospect of ineﬃcient retaliations may lead the negotiators to choose a safeguard tariﬀ rate
below the politically eﬃcient tariﬀ in periods of intense political pressures.10 Therefore, the
second channel through which governments may benefit from the reduced rate of retaliation
is that they can agree on a politically more eﬃcient, i.e., higher, tariﬀ rate for periods of
intense political pressures.
A drawback of the WTO safeguard agreement, however, is that the condition for
truthful revelation of private information is binding for low qualities of DSP judgment in
which case negotiators have to choose a less eﬃcient tariﬀ schedule (l, s) to ensure incentive
compatibility of the agreement. In what follows, I show that for low levels of judgment qual-
ity, the costs to the governments of switching to the WTO Safeguard Agreement outweighs
its benefits. Therefore, a high-quality dispute settlement process is the key to a successful
transition from GATT to the WTO.
The political payoﬀs under the WTO are increasing in the accuracy of judg-
ment, γ, achieving full political eﬃciency when γ = 1. To show this, I use the en-
velope theorem. For γ ∈ [γ1, γ2], the government’s optimization problem is given by
max
sWr
PW
¡
2m (θ, γ)− sWr, sWr
¢
. Apply the envelope theorem to get:
dPW
¡
2m (θ, γ)− sWr, sWr
¢
dγ
= −ρ
£
u
¡
sWr; θ
¢
+ v
¡
sWr
¢¤
+ ρ
£
u(2m (θ, γ)− sWr; θ) + v
¡
2m (θ, γ)− sWr
¢¤
+(2 (1− ρ) + ργ)
£
u0
¡
2m (θ, γ)− sWr; θ
¢
+ v0
¡
2m (θ, γ)− sWr
¢¤× 2dm (θ, γ)
dγ
The expression on the second line is positive because
u(2m (θ, γ)−sWr; θ)+v
¡
2m (θ, γ)− sWr
¢
= u
³
lWl; θ
´
+v
³
lWl
´
> u(sWr; θ)+v
¡
sWr
¢
.
10Lemma 3 states that sWu < τPE

θ

.
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The expression on the third line is also positive because
u0(2m (θ, γ)− sWr; θ) + v0
¡
2m (θ, γ)− sWr
¢
= u0
³
lWl; θ
´
+ v0
³
lWl; θ
´
< 0,
and dm(θ,γ)dγ < 0. For γ > γ2, the government’s optimization problem is given by maxlWu,sWu
PW (lWu, sWu).
Applying the envelope theorem yields
dPW (lWu, sWu)
dγ
= ρ
£
u(lWu; θ) + v(lWu)− u(sWu; θ)− v
¡
sWu
¢¤
> 0.
Political welfare under the WTO for diﬀerent levels of γ is depicted in Figure
(8). The upper curve depicts PW (lWu, sWu (γ)), which is the political welfare under the
WTO as a function of γ assuming that the incentive constraint (III.11) is not binding.
The lower curve, PW
¡
lWr (γ) , sWr (γ)
¢
, represents the political payoﬀ under the WTO
when the incentive constraint (III.11) is binding. These two curves are tangent at γ = γ2.
Furthermore, as was noted in Lemma 6, for γ < γ1 the negotiated agreement under the
WTO is a non-contingent contract which is represented by the line segment ab on the graph.
Therefore, political welfare under the WTO is depicted by the segments ab (when tariﬀs
are non-contingent), bc (when the incentive constraint (III.11) is binding), and cd (when
the incentive constraints are not binding).
Political welfare under GATT, PG
¡
lG, sG
¢
, which is independent of γ, is repre-
sented by a horizontal line in Figure 8. As depicted on the graph, PG
¡
lG, sG
¢
always lie be-
low the upper curve, PW
¡
lWu, sWu
¢
, and it intersects with the lower curve, PW
¡
lWr, sWr
¢
,
at γ = bγ ∈ (γ1, γ2). In other words:
Proposition 4 There exists bγ ∈ (γ1, γ2), such that the negotiated tariﬀs under the WTO
Safeguard Agreement generate a higher expected political payoﬀ than does the negotiated
tariﬀs under the GATT escape clause, if and only if γ > bγ. Moreover, these expected
payoﬀs are equal if and only if γ = bγ.
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Figure 8. Comparing Expected Political Welfare under WTO and GATT.
Social welfare under WTO vs. GATT
Under the political trade model presented above, trade agreements fall short of so-
cial eﬃciency because governments give unequal weights to the welfare of import competing
sectors and consumers. In fact, reforms in the world trading system can be understood as
attempts by governments to improve the political eﬃciency of their trade partnership but
it is not clear if such reforms promote social eﬃciency as well. In this section, I investigate
the eﬀect of reforms in the escape clause on social welfare. The social welfare function is
defined similar to the political welfare function but with equal weights given to consumers’
and producers’ surplus.
As was noted in the previous section, the governments’ gains from transition to
WTO are twofold. First, the safeguard agreement of the WTO reduces the pain to the
governments from protecting their industries in periods of high political pressure, by re-
stricting the use of the retaliation provision. Second, under the auspices of the safeguard
agreement, the governments will be protecting their troubled industries more vigorously.
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The latter channel of political gain is certainly bad news from a social welfare point of view,
as a higher rate of protection in any situation translates to lower social welfare.11 However,
social welfare is improved through the former channel of political gains, as lower frequency
of trade skirmishes reduces the average tariﬀ rates. But it turns out that the social costs of
the new escape clause outweigh its social gains and, thus, social welfare is undermined as a
result of the reforms in the escape clause:
Proposition 5 Social welfare is higher under the GATT escape clause (Article XIX) than
under the WTO escape clause (the safeguard agreement).12
This result, however, should be viewed in the context of this paper where no
alternative protectionist measure is allowed to be taken by the negotiating parties. In
practice, there are substitute measures for safeguards, such as antidumping, VERs, and
hidden trade barriers, that governments can use to diﬀuse occasional protectionist pressures
generated by domestic interest groups. These substitute measures are usually considered
worse than safeguards as they are less transparent, violate the MFN principle and generate
ineﬃciency due to trade diversion, and aﬀord higher trade barriers for a longer period of
time (Bown 2002). Therefore, an appropriate framework to analyze the social welfare eﬀect
of the Safeguard Agreement is one that recognizes the existence and substitutability of
alternative trade barriers. In fact, the new escape clause may be more favorable in terms
of social eﬃciency as it motivates the governments to rely more on safeguard measures in
lieu of antidumping, VERs, and hidden trade barriers.
Enforcement
11With equal weights on the surplus of consumers and producers (i.e., θ = 1), welfare is decreasing in
tariﬀs and the most eﬃcient cooperative tariﬀ rate is zero.
12As will be seen in the next section, in a non-cooperative environment there is another channel through
which political as well as social welfare can be improved by switching to the WTO.
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Thus far, I have characterized the incentive-compatible trade agreements under
GATT and the WTO that maximize the joint political welfare of the negotiating govern-
ments. However, a trade agreement should be not only incentive-compatible (in terms of
inducing truthful reporting of the state of the world), but also self-enforcing. In this Section,
I adopt a repeated-game framework to account for the enforcement issue. If governments
are suﬃciently patient, the incentive-compatible agreements characterized above are self-
enforcing. The minimum level of patience required to sustain an agreement, however, can
diﬀer across institutions. Therefore, introducing the enforcement problem can alter our
analysis on the relative performance of GATT and the WTO.
Assume that the static games described above are repeated over an infinite number
of periods. In each period a new political pressure is realized in each country according to the
same random process explained above, i.e., a high (low) pressure is realized with probability
ρ (1−ρ, respectively). Any observable deviation from the strategy profile prescribed by the
agreement will trigger a reversion to Nash tariﬀs (i.e., a collapse of the agreement) in both
sectors and all subsequent periods.
When governments set tariﬀs non-cooperatively, a government’s best option is to
set τN
¡
θ
¢
on the imports of the sector where political pressure is high, and to set τN (θ)
on the imports of the sector with low political pressure. Therefore, the expected per-period
welfare of the government when there is no cooperation is given by
PN = ρ
£
u
¡
τN
¡
θ
¢
; θ
¢
+ v
¡
τN
¡
θ
¢¢
+ u
¡
τN (θ) ; θ
¢
+ v
¡
τN (θ)
¢¤
+2 (1− ρ)
£
u
¡
τN (θ) ; θ
¢
+ v
¡
τN (θ)
¢¤
= ρ
£
u
¡
τN
¡
θ
¢
; θ
¢
+ v
¡
τN
¡
θ
¢¢¤
+ (2− ρ)
£
u
¡
τN (θ) ; θ
¢
+ v
¡
τN (θ)
¢¤
.
The discounted future value of cooperation under agreement A = {W,G}, can be written
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as δ1−δ
¡
PA − PN
¢
, where δ is the common discount factor of the governments. On the
other hand, given a cooperative tariﬀ schedule (l, s), in periods of low political pressure,
the value of deviation to a government is 2
¡
u
¡
τN (θ) ; θ
¢
− u (l; θ)
¢
. Similarly, in periods of
high political pressures, the value of deviation to a government is u
¡
τN
¡
θ
¢
; θ
¢
− u
¡
s; θ
¢
+
u
¡
τN (θ) ; θ
¢
− u (l; θ). Therefore, the enforceability constraints can be written as
2
£
u
¡
τN (θ) ; θ
¢
− u (l; θ)
¤
≤ δ
1− δ
¡
PA − PN
¢
, (III.14)
and
u
¡
τN
¡
θ
¢
; θ
¢
− u
¡
s; θ
¢
+ u
¡
τN (θ) ; θ
¢
− u (l; θ) ≤ δ
1− δ
¡
PA − PN
¢
. (III.15)
Let δG denote the minimum discount factor for which
¡
lG, sG
¢
is self-enforcing
under GATT. Similarly, define δW (γ) to be the minimum discount factor for which
¡
lW , sW
¢
is self-enforcing under the WTO when judgment quality is γ. Now recall from Proposition
2 that the value of cooperation is the same across the institutions when the WTO judgment
quality is at its critical level, bγ. On the other hand, for γ = bγ, the value of cheating to
a government is lower under the WTO than under GATT. That is because, as shown in
Lemmas 3 and 7, the negotiated tariﬀs under the WTO are closer to the Nash tariﬀs than
are the negotiated tariﬀs under GATT, i.e., lG < lWr < τN (θ) and sG < sWr < τN
¡
θ
¢
.
Therefore,
Proposition 6 For δ = δG and γ = bγ, the WTO’s enforceability conditions are not binding
and the best incentive-compatible tariﬀ schedule under the WTO,i.e.,
¡
lW , sW
¢
, is self-
enforcing. Moreover, δW (bγ) < δG.
This proposition is interesting in that it states when the value of cooperation is
equal across the two institutions, sustaining cooperation is easier under the WTO than
under GATT.
62
 Wδ  
δ  
Gδ  
1 
GATT WTO 
γ  
1γˆ
Figure 9. For impatient governments (i.e., when δW < δ < δG), WTO outperforms GATT
for a larger range of γ.
Corollary 3 If δW (bγ) ≤ δ < δG, the minimum judgment quality for which the political
welfare is higher under the WTO than under GATT is less than bγ.13
This Corollary is shown in Figure (9). For δ > δG, the critical value of γ is what
we obtained under full commitment, i.e., γ = bγ. However, as δ falls below δG the critical
value of γ, above which the political welfare is higher under the WTO than under GATT,
decreases. This analysis suggests that the dispute settlement process of the WTO can
improve the enforceability of trade agreements despite the fact that it does not provide any
external enforcement.
Optimal court
So far I have assumed that the only role for the WTO court is to generate a public
signal by announcing the result of its investigations. This ruling mechanism, however, does
not necessarily maximize the joint welfare of the WTO member countries. In this section
I take a mechanism design approach (with the restriction that the authorized retaliation
13No clear conclusion was obtained for δ < δW (eγ). Therefore, I restrict my attention to δ > δW (eγ).
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must be reciprocal) to characterize the court’s ruling behavior that maximizes the expected
joint political welfare.
I assume that after observing eθ, the court rules in favor of the defendant with
probability r(eθ). Letting α ≡ r(θ) and β ≡ r(θ), the expected joint political welfare can be
written as follows
W (l, s, α, β) ≡ 2 (1− ρ) [u (l; θ) + v (l)]
+ρ
£
u
¡
s; θ
¢
+ v (s)
¤
+ργ (α [u (l; θ) + v (l)] + (1− α) [u (s; θ) + v (s)])
+ρ (1− γ) (β [u (l; θ) + v (l)] + (1− β) [u (s; θ) + v (s)]) .
or, equivalently,
W (l, s, α, β) ≡ ρ
£
u
¡
s; θ
¢
+ v (s) + [γ (1− α) + (1− γ) (1− β)] [u (s; θ) + v (s)]
¤
+ [2 (1− ρ) + ργα+ ρ (1− γ)β] [u (l; θ) + v (l)]
Moreover, the incentive compatibility constraints are
u (s; θ) + (1− γ) [αv (l) + (1− α) v (s)] + γ [βv (l) + (1− β) v (s)]
≤ u (l; θ) + v (l) (III.16)
and
u
¡
s; θ
¢
+ γ [αv (l) + (1− α) v (s)] + (1− γ) [βv (l) + (1− β) v (s)]
≥ u
¡
l; θ
¢
+ v (l) (III.17)
The following proposition summarizes the optimal ruling strategy.
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Figure 10. Anti-Trade and Pro-Trade Bias of an Optimal Court
Proposition 7 α and β are weakly increasing in γ. Moreover, there is γ ∈
£
1
2 , 1
¤
such that½
0 < α < 1, β = 0 if γ < γ,
α = 1, 0 < β < 1 if γ > γ.
γ is decreasing in ρ, and is strictly less than one. Finally, there exists bρ such that for ρ > bρ
we have γ = 12 .
Figures (10) and (11) illustrate this proposition for the cases where ρ < bρ and
ρ > bρ, respectively. The vertical axis is the probability of a pro-defendant or anti-trade
ruling by the court and the horizontal axis is the court’s judgment quality. As can be seen
on the graph, α and β are weakly increasing in the judgment quality.
In comparison with the ruling behavior of a public signalling device, an optimal
court shows a pro-trade (or, pro-complainant) bias when γ is suﬃciently small, while for a
large γ the optimal court shows an anti-trade (or, pro-defendant) bias. Formally,
Corollary 4 If ρ > bρ, the optimal court is pro-defendant (or, anti-trade) for all values of
γ ∈
¡
1
2 , 1
¢
. If ρ < bρ, then the optimal court is pro-defendant if γ > γ, and is pro-complainant
if γ < γ.
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Figure 11. Optimal ruling when the probability of a high shock is suﬃciently large.
For an intuition of this result, recall that for suﬃciently high accuracy of judgment,
the incentive compatibility constraints are not binding when the court’s only role is to reveal
the result of its investigations (Lemma 5). When the incentive compatibility constraint is
not binding, a lower probability of a trade skirmish, or equivalently, a higher probability
of pro-defendant ruling, would still ensure incentive compatibility. Under this situations,
the court can improve the welfare of the parties by adopting an anti-trade bias because
such a ruling strategy reduces the rate of trade skirmishes without violating the incentive
compatibility constraint.
Maintaining a biased legal system may seem impractical. However, the quasi-legal
system of the WTO may be able to generate a systematic anti-trade or pro-trade bias by
carefully allocating the burden of proof on the appropriate party.
Conclusion
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I have modeled the WTO dispute settlement process as providing a public signal
that is correlated with the true state of the world. Countries can condition their tariﬀ
policies on this signal; in contrast, no such signal is available under GATT. I have found that
if this signal involves a suﬃciently high level of accuracy, then trade agreements under the
WTO Agreement on Safeguards provides higher political welfare than does trade agreements
under the corresponding GATT escape clause. This improvement arises through three
diﬀerent channels. First governments are better oﬀ by cutting back on the frequency of
eﬃciency-reducing trade skirmishes under the WTO. Second, the governments will be able
to coordinate on a more politically eﬃcient tariﬀ schedule under the WTO. Finally, the self-
enforceability of trade agreements is improved by the introduction of the dispute settlement
process of the WTO. This allows the negotiating countries to coordinate on more cooperative
trade policies that improve the political welfare of the governments.
In this paper I assume that a safeguard measure is the only option for the WTO
signatories if they want to restrict imports in response to high political pressure from their
domestic interest groups. In practice, however, the governments can choose from a variety
of policy options including antidumping, VERs, and hidden trade barriers. An interesting
extension to this paper would be to consider the existence and substitutability of these
alternative trade barriers. This will be particularly helpful in discussing the eﬀect of reforms
in the GATT escape clause on social welfare.
Appendix
Equilibrium prices. World market clearing condition for good x is
Dx (px) +D∗x (px − τ) = Qx (px) +Q∗x (px − τ) .
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Substituting for the supply and demand functions from (III.1) and (III.2), the market
clearing condition can be rewritten as:
2− 2px + τ = px + b (px − τ) .
Solving for px yields px =
2+(1+b)τ
3+b . Similarly, using the world market clearing condition for
good y, the home market price for good y can be calculated; py =
2(1−τ∗)
3+b .
Producers’ surplus, consumers’ surplus, and tariﬀ revenues. The con-
sumers’ surplus from consumption of good x is
ψx (τ) =
Z 1
px
Dx (u) du =
1
2
− px +
1
2
p2x =
1
2
µ
(1 + b) (1− τ)
3 + b
¶2
.
Similarly, the consumers’ surplus from consumption of good y can be obtained by using px:
ψy (τ
∗) =
1
2
µ
1 + b+ 2τ∗
3 + b
¶2
.
The producers’ surplus in sector x of the home country is
πx (τ) =
Z px
0
Qx (u) du =
1
2
p2x =
1
2
µ
2 + (1 + b) τ
3 + b
¶2
.
The producers’ surplus in sector y of the home country is
πy (τ∗) =
Z py
0
Qy (u) du =
1
2
bp2y = 2b
µ
1− τ∗
3 + b
¶2
.
The import demand is given by:
M (px) = Dx (px)−Qx (px) = 1− 2px =
b− 1− 2 (1 + b) τ
3 + b
.
Therefore, the government’s tariﬀ revenue is
T (τ) = τMx (px (τ)) =
(b− 1) τ − 2 (1 + b) τ2
3 + b
.
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Welfare functions. Politically weighted welfare from the importing sector in
home country is given by
u (τ ; θ) = ψx (τ) + θπx (τ) + T (τ)
=
1
2
µ
(1 + b) (1− τ)
3 + b
¶2
+
θ
2
µ
2 + (1 + b) τ
3 + b
¶2
+
(b− 1) τ − 2 (1 + b) τ2
3 + b
=
1
(3 + b)2
½
1
2
(1 + b)2 (1− τ)2 + θ
2
(2 + (1 + b) τ)2 + (3 + b) (b− 1) τ − 2 (3 + b) (1 + b) τ2
¾
=
1
(3 + b)2
½
1
2
(1 + b)2 + 2θ + [2θ (1 + b)− 4] τ +
∙
1 + θ
2
(1 + b)2 − 2 (3 + b) (1 + b)
¸
τ2
¾
.
Moreover, the home government’s welfare from the exporting sector is:
v (τ∗) = ψy (τ
∗) + πy (τ∗) =
1
2
µ
1 + b+ 2τ∗
3 + b
¶2
+ 2b
µ
1− τ∗
3 + b
¶2
=
1
(3 + b)2
(
(1 + b)2
2
+ 2b+ 2 (1− b) τ∗ + 2 (1 + b) τ∗2
)
.
For further use, note that
u0 (τ ; θ) =
1
(3 + b)2
©
[2θ (1 + b)− 4] +
£
θ − 11 + 2 (θ − 7) b+ (θ − 3) b2
¤
τ
ª
,
u00 (τ ; θ) =
θ − 11 + 2 (θ − 7) b+ (θ − 3) b2
(3 + b)2
= −(1 + b) (11 + 3b− θ (b+ 1))
(3 + b)2
,
v0 (τ∗) =
2
(3 + b)2
[(1− b) + 2 (1 + b) τ∗] ,
and,
v00 (τ∗) =
4 (1 + b)
(3 + b)2
.
Nash tariﬀ. Non-cooperative (Nash) tariﬀ, τN , as a function of political pressure
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solves u0
¡
τN ; θ
¢
= 0. Rearranging yields
τN =
4− 2θ (1 + b)
(−11− (3− θ) b+ θ) (1 + b) =
2θ (1 + b)− 4
11− θ + 2 (7− θ) b+ (3− θ) b2 .
Politically eﬃcient tariﬀ. Politically eﬃcient home tariﬀ should maximize
the joint welfare of the governments which is given by u (τ ; θ) + v (τ). FOC is given by
u0 (τ ; θ) + v0 (τ) = 0, or equivalently, by
1
(3 + b)2
©
[2θ (1 + b)− 4] +
£
θ − 11 + 2 (θ − 7) b+ (θ − 3) b2
¤
τ
ª
+
2
(3 + b)2
[(1− b) + 2 (1 + b) τ ] = 0.
Solving for τ yields:
τPE = − 2 (1 + b) (θ − 1)
[θ − 7 + 2 (θ − 5) b+ (θ − 3) b2] =
2 (θ − 1)
7− θ + b (3− θ) .
The SOC is given by u00 (τ ; θ) + v00 (τ) < 0, or θ < 3b+7b+1 . Therefore, the SOC is satisfied
since I assume θ < 3b−1b+1 .
Non-prohibitive tariﬀs . Import tariﬀs are non-prohibitive if and only if
M (px) =
b−1−2(1+b)τ
3+b > 0,or, equivalently if and only if τ <
b−1
2(1+b) . Therefore τ
N (θ) is
non-prohibitive if and only if
2θ (1 + b)− 4
11− θ + 2 (7− θ) b+ (3− θ) b2 <
b− 1
2 (1 + b)
.
Simplifying yields the counterpart to the Assumption 1: θ < 3b−11+b .
Proof of Lemma 1. It is suﬃcient to show that when θ < 3b−1b+1 we have
u00 (τ ; θ) < 0, u0 (0; θ) > 0, v00 (τ∗) > 0, and v0 (0) < 0.
u00 (τ ; θ) is negative iﬀ 11 + 3b− θ (b+ 1) > 0, or θ < b+111+3b , which holds because
b+1
11+3b =
(3b+7)−(2b+6)
(b+1)+(2b+10) <
3b+7
b+1 . Also, u
0 (0; θ) = 2θ(1+b)−4
(3+b)2
is positive iﬀ θ > 21+b , which
holds since b > 1 and θ > 1. Moreover, v0 (0) = 2(1−b)
(3+b)2
< 0 because b > 1. Finally,
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v00 (τ∗) = 4(1+b)
(3+b)2
> 0.
Proof of Lemma 2. Take the total derivative of the FOC that characterizes
τN (θ), with respect to τN and θ, to obtain:
£
ψ00x
¡
τN
¢
+ θπ00x
¡
τN
¢
+ T 00
¡
τN
¢¤
dτN + π0x
¡
τN
¢
dθ = 0.
Rearranging yields
dτN
dθ
=
−π0x
¡
τN
¢£
ψ00x (τN ) + θπ00x (τN ) + T 00 (τN )
¤ .
This ratio is positive because both the numerator and the denominator have negative values.
Similarly, it can be shown that dτ
PE
dθ > 0.
Proof of Lemma 3. Note that PW (l, s) is additively separable in functions of
l and s, and we can write
lWu ≡ argmax
l
[u (l; θ) + v (l)] = τE (θ) ,
sWu ≡ argmax
s
©£
u
¡
s; θ
¢
+ v (s)
¤
+ (1− γ) [u (s; θ) + v (s)]
ª
.
To verify that τPE (θ) < sWu ≤ τPE
¡
θ
¢
, it is suﬃcient to show that the concave function£
u
¡
s; θ
¢
+ v (s)
¤
+ (1− γ) [u (s; θ) + v (s)] is increasing when s = τPE (θ) and decreasing
when s = τPE
¡
θ
¢
. I do this by taking first derivative of this function and evaluating it at
τPE (θ) and τPE
¡
θ
¢
:
£
u0
¡
τPE (θ) ; θ
¢
+ v0
¡
τPE (θ)
¢¤
+ (1− γ)
£
u0
¡
τPE (θ) ; θ
¢
+ v0
¡
τPE (θ)
¢¤
=
£
u0
¡
τPE (θ) ; θ
¢
+ v0
¡
τPE (θ)
¢¤
> 0,
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and
£
u0
¡
τPE
¡
θ
¢
; θ
¢
+ v0
¡
τPE
¡
θ
¢¢¤
+ (1− γ)
£
u0
¡
τPE
¡
θ
¢
; θ
¢
+ v0
¡
τPE
¡
θ
¢¢¤
= (1− γ)
£
u0
¡
τPE
¡
θ
¢
; θ
¢
+ v0
¡
τPE
¡
θ
¢¢¤
< 0.
To verify that sWu is increasing in γ, write the first-order condition that charac-
terizes sWu:
£
u0
¡
sWu; θ
¢
+ v0
¡
sWu
¢¤
+ (1− γ)
£
u0
¡
sWu; θ
¢
+ v0
¡
sWu
¢¤
= 0,
and take its total derivative with respect to sWu and γ, and rearrange to obtain:
dsWu
dγ
=
u0
¡
sWu; θ
¢
+ v0
¡
sWu
¢£
u00
¡
sWu; θ
¢
+ v00 (sWu)
¤
+ (1− γ) [u00 (sWu; θ) + v00 (sWu)]
> 0.
This ratio is positive because both the numerator and the denominator have negative values.
Proof of Lemma 4. Note that
u00(τ ; θ)+αv00(τ) = −(1 + b)(11 + 3b− θ(b+ 1))
(3 + b2)2
+α
4(1 + b)
(3 + b)2
= −(1 + b)[−4α+ (11 + 3b)− θ(b+ 1)]
(3 + b)2
.
Thus, to prove the concavity of u(τ ; θ) + αv(τ) it is suﬃcient to show that −4α + (11 +
3b) − θ(b + 1) > 0, or, equivalently, θ < 11+3b−4αb+1 . But this holds because 0 < α < 1 and
θ < 3b−1b+1 by assumption. Also note that u(τ ; θ) + αv(τ) is a quadratic function and, thus,
symmetric around m (θ, α).
Proof of Lemma 6. According to Lemma 5, the incentive constraint (III.11)
is binding for γ < γ2, i.e.:
u (s; θ) + γv (s) = u (l; θ) + γv (l) .
Since u (τ ; θ)+γv (τ) is concave in τ and symmetric around τ = m (θ, γ), the above equality
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holds if and only if one of the following equations hold:
l + s = 2m (θ, γ) , (III.18)
l = s. (III.19)
Define γ1 as the solution to sWu (γ) = m (θ, γ) when solving for γ. This equation
has a unique solution since ds
Wu(γ)
dγ > 0,
dm(θ,γ)
dγ < 0, s
Wu (0) < m (θ, 0), and sWu (1) >
m (θ, 1). In other words, there exists γ1 ∈ (0, 1) such that
sWu (γ) < m (θ, γ) if γ < γ1,
sWu (γ) = m (θ, γ) if γ = γ1,
sWu (γ) > m (θ, γ) if γ > γ1.
Moreover, we have γ1 < γ2. To show this, it is suﬃcient to show that sWu (γ2) > m (θ, γ2).
But, by the definition of γ2, we have sWu (γ2) = 2m (θ, γ2) − lWu which implies that
sWu (γ2) = 2m (θ, γ2)−m (θ, 1) > m (θ, γ2).
Finally note that, having fixed γ and ρ, PW (l, s) increases when |l− lWu| and/or
|s − sWu| decreases, and PW (l, s) is maximized when l = lWu and s = sWu. Now we are
ready to prove the Lemma.
First I show that when γ1 ≤ γ ≤ γ2, the solution to the negotiators’ problem,
satisfy l+ s = 2m (θ, γ). On the contrary suppose that l+ s 6= 2m (θ, γ), which implies that
l = s ≡ τ0. Moreover, when γ1 ≤ γ ≤ γ2 we have lWu < m (θ, γ) < sWu (γ). Therefore, one
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of the following should hold:
τ0 ≤ lWu < m (θ, γ) < sWu (γ) ,
lWu < τ0 < m (θ, γ) < sWu (γ) ,
lWu < m (θ, γ) ≤ τ0 < sWu (γ) ,
lWu < m (θ, γ) < sWu (γ) ≤ τ0.
In the first two cases, setting l = τ0 and s = 2m (θ, γ) − τ0 will be incentive compatible
and will generate a higher political welfare than l = s = τ0, because |2m (θ, γ) − τ0 −
sWu| < |τ0 − sWu|. In the latter cases, setting s = τ0 and l = 2m (θ, γ) − τ0 will be
incentive compatible and will generate a higher political welfare than l = s = τ0, because
|2m (θ, γ)− τ0 − lWu| < |τ0 − lWu|.
Finally, when γ < γ1 the solution to the WTO negotiators’ problem must satisfy
l = s. On the contrary, suppose that l 6= s which implies that l+ s = 2m (θ, γ). I will show
that (l, l) generates a higher payoﬀ than (l, s) by proving that |l− sWu| < |s− sWu|. Since
lWu < sWu (γ) < m (θ, γ) and l + s = 2m (θ, γ), one of the following should hold:
l < sWu < m (θ, γ) < s,
or sWu < l < m (θ, γ) < s.
If the former holds, we have |l − sWu| < |s − sWu| because 0 < sWu − l < m (θ, γ) − l +
m (θ, γ)− sWu = s− sWu. If the latter holds, again we have |l− sWu| < |s− sWu| because
0 < l − sWu < s− sWu.
Proof of Lemma 7. According to Lemma 6, when γ1 < γ < γ2, the optimal
solution to (III.13) is given by
¡
lWr, sWr
¢
, where lWr+sWr = 2m (θ, γ). Therefore, problem
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(III.13) can be written as
max
s
PW (2m (θ, γ)− s, s)
= ρ
£
u
¡
s; θ
¢
+ v (s)
¤
+ ρ (1− γ) [u (s; θ) + v (s)] + (2 (1− ρ) + ργ) [u (2m (θ, γ)− s; θ) + v (2m (θ, γ)− s
and the FOC is given by
dPW (2m (θ, γ)− s, s)
ds
= ρ
£
u0
¡
s; θ
¢
+ v0 (s)
¤
+ ρ (1− γ)
£
u0 (s; θ) + v0 (s)
¤
− (2 (1− ρ) + ργ)
£
u0 (2m (θ, γ)− s; θ) + v0 (2m (θ, γ)− s)
¤
= 0.
It is suﬃcient to show that an optimal solution cannot contain sWr ≤ sWu or lWr ≤ lWu.
Suppose that sWr ≤ sWu. This implies that
ρ
£
u0
¡
sWr; θ
¢
+ v0
¡
sWr
¢¤
+ ρ (1− γ)
£
u0
¡
sWr; θ
¢
+ v
¡
sWr
¢¤
> 0.
It also implies that lWr = 2m (θ, γ) − sWr > lWu since when γ1 < γ < γ2 we have
sWu < 2m (θ, γ)− lWu. Thus,
£
u0
¡
2m (θ, γ)− sWr; θ
¢
+ v0
¡
2m (θ, γ)− sWr
¢¤
< 0.
Therefore,
dPW (2m(θ,γ)−sWr ,sWr)
ds > 0 and the optimality condition is not satisfied. Thus,
sWr > sWu.
Now suppose that lWr ≤ lWu. This implies that 2m (θ, γ)− sWr ≤ lWu and that
£
u0
¡
2m (θ, γ)− sWr; θ
¢
+ v0
¡
2m (θ, γ)− sWr
¢¤
> 0.
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It also implies that sWr = 2m (θ, γ)− lWr > sWu. Thus
ρ
£
u0
¡
sWr; θ
¢
+ v0
¡
sWr
¢¤
+ ρ (1− γ)
£
u0
¡
sWr; θ
¢
+ v
¡
sWr
¢¤
< 0.
Therefore,
dPW (2m(θ,γ)−sWr ,sWr)
ds < 0 and the optimality condition is not satisfied. Thus,
lWr > lWs.
Proof of Proposition 4. When γ = 0 we have PW (l, s) ≡ PG(l, s) which implies
that lWu = lG and sWu = sG. It then follows that when γ = 0, we have PW
¡
lWu, sWu
¢
=
PG
¡
lG, sG
¢
. Moreover PW
¡
lWu, sWu
¢
is increasing in γ, while PG
¡
lG, sG
¢
is independent
of γ. This proves that PG
¡
lG, sG
¢
is below PW
¡
lWu, sWu
¢
for γ ∈ (0, 1].
To verify that γ1 < bγ < γ2, it is now suﬃcient to show
PW
¡
lWr (γ1) , s
Wr (γ1)
¢
< PG
¡
lG, sG
¢
,
and
PW
¡
lWr (γ2) , s
Wr (γ2)
¢
> PG
¡
lG, sG
¢
.
But note that PW
¡
lWr (γ1) , sWr (γ1)
¢
is equal to the highest payoﬀs attainable under
a non-contingent agreement and it must be smaller than the government’s payoﬀ under
GATT (because any non-contingent agreement is feasible, i.e., incentive compatible, un-
der the GATT rules). Moreover, lWr (γ2) = lWu and sWr (γ2) = sWu (γ2) and, thus,
PW
¡
lWr (γ2) , sWr (γ2)
¢
is equal to PW
¡
lWu (γ2) , sWu (γ2)
¢
which is larger than PG
¡
lG, sG
¢
.
Proof of Proposition 5. Social welfare under GATT, denoted by SG, can be
written as follows:
SG = 2
©
ρ
£
u
¡
sG; 1
¢
+ v
¡
sG
¢¤
+ (1− ρ)
£
u
¡
lG; 1
¢
+ v
¡
lG
¢¤ª
.
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This is identical to the political welfare under GATT if θ = θ = 1. Similarly, social welfare
under the WTO, denoted by SW , is given by:
SW (γ) =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
SWr (γ) if γ1 < γ < γ2
SWu (γ) if γ > γ2
where,
SWr (γ) = ρ (2− γ)
£
u
¡
sWr; 1
¢
+ v
¡
sWr
¢¤
+ (2 (1− ρ) + ργ)
£
u
¡
lWr; 1
¢
+ v
¡
lWr
¢¤
,
SWu (γ) = ρ (2− γ)
£
u
¡
sWu; 1
¢
+ v
¡
sWu
¢¤
+ (2 (1− ρ) + ργ)
£
u
¡
lWu; 1
¢
+ v
¡
lWu
¢¤
.
To prove the proposition (i.e., SW (γ) < SG ∀γ ∈ (γ1, 1)), it is suﬃcient to show that
SWu (γ) < SG ∀γ ∈ [0, 1] and that WSr (γ) < SWu (γ) ∀γ ∈ [0, γ2].
To show the former, I prove that SWu (0) = SG, dS
Wu(0)
dγ < 0, and
d2SWu(γ)
dγ2 < 0.
When γ = 0, we have sWu = sG, lWu = sWu and SWu (0) = 2
©£
u
¡
sG; 1
¢
+ v
¡
sG
¢¤
+ (1− ρ)
£
u
¡
lG; 1
¢
+ v
¡
l
SG. Substituting for u (., .) and v (.) in SWu (γ) and taking derivative yields
dSWu
dγ
=
ρ (1 + b)
(3 + b)
×
½¡
sWu
¢2 − 2 (2− γ) sWudSWu
dγ
¾
.
Now substitute, sWu (γ = 0) = 2(θ−1)5b+13−(1+b)θ ,
dSWu(γ=0)
dγ =
4(3+b)(θ−1)
[5b+13−(1+b)θ]2 , and γ = 0 to get
dSWu(0)
dγ = −
4ρ(θ−1)2(1+b)[(1+b)θ+11+3b]
(3+b)[5b+13−(1+b)θ]3 < 0. Moreover,
d2SWu (γ)
dγ2
= −32ρ (1 + b) (θ − 1)
2 (5 + θ − 3γ + (1− γ + θ) b)
[5b+ 13− (1 + b) θ − 2γ (3 + b)]4
< 0.
To show the latter, first note that for γ < γ2 the incentive constraint, given by
s + l ≥ 2m(θ, γ), is binding which implies sWu + lWu < 2m(θ, γ), sWr + lWr = 2m(θ, γ),
and sWu + lWu < sr + lr. It then follows that sWu < sWr and lWu < lWr, because if
sWu > sWr and lWu < lWr the political welfare in case of a binding constraint can be raised
by decreasing sWr, and if sWu < sWrand lWu > lWr political welfare in case of a binding
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constraint can be raised by decreasing lWr. Therefore, WSr (γ) < WSu (γ) ∀γ ∈ [0, γ2].
Lemma 8 In optimum, it is impossible to have α and β simultaneously and strictly between
zero and one.
Proof. On the contrary assume that 0 < α, β < 1. Then, a necessary condition
for optimality is:
∂W (l,s,α,β)
∂α
(1− γ) (v (l)− v (s)) =
∂W (l,s,α,β)
∂β
γ (v (l)− v (s))
or
ργ {[u (l; θ) + v (l)]− [u (s; θ) + v (s)]}
1− γ =
ρ (1− γ) {[u (l; θ) + v (l)]− [u (s; θ) + v (s)]}
γ
or
γ
1− γ =
1− γ
γ
which is not satisfied for γ > 12 .
Lemma 9 α and β are weakly increasing in γ. Moreover, α > β.
Lemma 10 For suﬃciently large γ we have α = 1 and β > 0.
Proof. Remember that when court is a pure public signalling device, that is
when α = 1 and β = 0, the incentive compatibility constraints are not binding when γ > γ2
(Lemma 5). Moreover, under this situations welfare is increasing in α and β. Therefore the
optimal solution must involve β > 0 for γ > γ2.
Lemma 11 When the court is a pure randomizing device, that is, when γ = 12 , the optimal
probability of pro-defendant ruling, denoted by η, is increasing in ρ. Moreover, there existbρ such that for ρ > bρ, we have η > 12 and for ρ ≤ bρ, η ≤ 12 .
Lemma 12 When γ = 12 , for ρ > bρ, we have α = 1 and β > 0. For ρ ≤ bρ, we have α < 1
and β = 0.
Proof. Note that when γ = 12 , we have η =
1
2 (α+ β) . If ρ > bρ, then according
to Lemma 11 we have (α+ β) > 12 . But since in optimum, it is impossible to have α and β
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simultaneously and strictly between zero and one, we must have α = 1 and β > 0. Similarly,
if ρ ≤ bρ, we have α < 1 and β = 0.
Proof of Proposition 7. This proposition follows from Lemmas 8-12.
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CHAPTER IV
A MODEL OF DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
Introduction
Engaging in the Dispute Settlement Process (DSP) of the World Trade Organi-
zation (WTO) can be quite costly for the WTO member countries. Therefore, one may
expect that if any dispute arises it should be settled in the early stages of DSP in order to
save on the costs of negotiations and litigation. However, the pattern of dispute settlements
shows that only 45 percent of all disputes are resolved in the consultation stage and more
than 30 percent of cases reach the Appellate Body ruling or further stages1 (Figure 12).
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Figure 12. Settlement Rates at diﬀerent stages of the WTO Dispute Settlement Process (1995-2005)
1The main stages of WTO DSP are Consultation (pre-trial negotiations between disputants), Dispute
Panel, and Appellate Body. See Beshkar and Bond (2008) for a summary of the DSP.
80
Under a domestic court setting, the models of settlement bargaining with asym-
metric information provide an explanation for the failure of settlement negotiations between
two disputants that leads to the costly process of the court. Two classic models in this lit-
erature are Bebchuk (1984) and Reinganum and Wilde (1986). A central theme of those
models is that, disputing parties engage in pre-trial negotiations to reach a settlement in
order to avoid costs of pursuing the dispute in a court of law. Pretrial negotiations, however,
may fail due to asymmetric information regarding amount of damages that the plaintiﬀ has
suﬀered or whether or not the defendant is responsible for the damages.
In disputes between private parties, a settlement normally involves a cash transfer
from the defending party to the complaining party. However, cash transfer has rarely been
used in the WTO to settle a trade dispute. Instead, a complaining country is usually com-
pensated through policy adjustments, such as a reduction in import tariﬀs in the defending
country. The type of available compensation mechanisms determines the payoﬀ structure
in the bargaining process, which may also aﬀect the outcome of the process. In particular,
while cash transfer is a zero-sum transaction, a policy adjustment is not necessarily zero-
sum. For example, as is well-known in the trade literature, a reduction in import tariﬀs
in an importing country generates more gains for the exporting country than losses to the
importing country.
In this chapter, I show that due to diﬀerences in methods of compensation in
private and the WTO disputes, classic models of settlement bargaining cannot correctly
explain the settlement pattern in the WTO. To show this, I extend those models to study the
determinants of out-of-court settlement under situations where the available compensation
mechanism features a positive-sum transaction. This added feature alters some of the
important predictions of the classic models. The models of Bebchuk (1984) and Reinganum
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and Wilde (1986) imply that the allocation of litigation costs between disputants has no
bearing on the likelihood of settlement. In contrast, I show that under a positive-sum
compensation mechanism, the likelihood of settlement is more sensitive to the defendant’s
litigation costs than to the complainant’s litigation costs. This analysis has important policy
implications, as it suggests that for the sake of a more eﬃcient dispute settlement process,
i.e., one that results in a higher settlement rate, a larger fraction of litigation costs should
be allocated to the defending parties in the WTO.2
Settlement Bargaining under the Allegation of Direct Breach
A country’s benefits from a trade agreement might be impaired or nullified by the
policies of the other country of the agreement. These policies might be direct or indirect
breach of the agreement. An example of direct breach is increasing the tariﬀ rate above the
agreed-upon level3. An indirect breach, however, nullifies the benefits of the breached-upon
country through indirect policies such as subsidies in case of tariﬀ-reduction agreements or
lack of property-right enforcement in case of TRIPs agreements. In either case, an injured
country is entitled to remedies from the infringer.
In this Section, I focus on the case of direct breach. In a direct breach, the dispute
is on the nature of the prevailed contingency. If such a case is litigated, the court issues its
opinion on the nature of the contingency and rules whether the defendant is in violation of
its obligation or not. If ruling is against the defendant, the defendant is supposed to reduce
its tariﬀ rate to a lower level (possibly the agreed-upon level) as specified by the court.
Similarly, a settlement schedule is a tariﬀ rate (lower than the disputed tariﬀ rate) oﬀered
2The DSP can manipulate the allocation of litigation costs by adopting appropriate rules about the
allocation of the burden of proof, for example.
3As will be explained below, an increase in the tariﬀ rate does not always constitute a breach of the
agreement.
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by one of the two parties.
In this Section I employ both screening and signaling models to analyze the set-
tlement bargaining problem when the defending party is accused of a direct breach in the
WTO.
Basic Setup
The defendant’s tariﬀ rate on the imports from the complainant at the time of the
dispute is denoted by τd, while τa
¡
≤ τd
¢
denote the tariﬀ rate that the defendant should
adopt in order to be in compliance with its obligations. When a dispute arises, renegotiation
takes place in order to deal with the dispute. It may result in a "mutually agreed solution"
which could be an adjustment in the defendant’s policy, an adjustment in the complainant’s
policy (e.g., withdrawal of past concessions), or both. If a mutually agreed solution is not
achieved, the case will escalate to the dispute panel. Generally, if defendant is found in
violation of its obligations, the panel will also specify a retaliatory policy that complainant
can adopt in case defendant does not comply with the panel ruling. However, since in this
paper the panel rulings are assumed to be enforceable, I ignore the possibility of retaliation.
Moreover, I assume that settlement is based on the adjustment in the defendant’s policy.
Suppose that the defendant adopts a new policy τ
¡
< τd
¢
. The welfare of defendant and
complainant as functions of the defendant’s new tariﬀ rate are given byWD (τ) andWC (τ),
where W 0D (τ) ≥ 0 and W 0C (τ) ≤ 0. Moreover, define:
Ω (τ) ≡WD
³
τd
´
−WD (τ)
and
∆ (τ) ≡WC (τ)−WC
³
τd
´
.
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As is clear from these definitions, Ω (τ) is the defendant’s welfare loss from lowering its
tariﬀ from the disputed level (i.e., τd) to τ , while ∆ (τ) is the complainant’s benefits from
this policy adjustment.
Assuming that trade is a positive-sum game, any increase in tariﬀ rates by one
party would decrease the two parties’ aggregate payoﬀ. So if deviation from the agreement
benefits one party it should hurt the other party to a larger extent. Similarly, the defendant’s
loss from reducing its tariﬀ rate is smaller than the complainant’s benefits from this policy
adjustment, i.e. Ω (τ) < ∆ (τ). For the sake of the tractability of the model I impose more
restriction on the functions Ω and ∆ as follows:
Assumption 1: Ω (τ) = α∆ (τ) for all 0 ≤ τ ≤ τd, where α < 1.
As will be seen in the following subsections, modifying the classical models of
settlement bargaining (e.g., Bebchuk (1984) and Reinganum and Wilde (1986)) according
to this assumption, reveals some interesting features of the settlement bargaining in the
WTO.
A Screening Model
Consider a case in which the defendant has better information about the dispute
case. In the case of implementing safeguard measures, for example, the defendant is bet-
ter informed about the economic conditions surrounding its import-competing industries.
Therefore, the defendant can make a better prediction about the ruling of the dispute panel
in case of litigation. On this basis, I assume that the probability of an adverse ruling
against the defendant, p, is private knowledge of the defendant, while the complainant
knows only that p is distributed over interval
£
p, p
¤
by a distribution function F (.). Here,
p is interpreted as the defendant’s type.
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The Bebchuk (1984) framework can be readily employed to model this situation.
Suppose that the complainant demands that the defendant adopts τ s rather than τd. If
the defendant fulfills this demand the case is settled, the complainant earns ∆ (τ s) and the
defendant incurs a cost of Ω (τ s). On the other hand, if the defendant does not accept this
oﬀer, the parties would bring the case before the dispute panel, in which case each of them
should pay their respective legal fees, namely, cD and cC .
Assuming that the panel ruling is enforceable, the defendant accepts τS if and
only if:
Ω (τ s) ≤ (1− p)× 0 + pΩ (τa) + cD (IV.1)
or, equivalently, if and only if:
p ≥ Ω (τ
s)− cD
Ω (τa)
(IV.2)
Hence, the defendant will accept τ s if and only if its type p is equal to or higher
than q (τ s), where q (τ s) is the marginal defendant type defined by
q (τ s) =
Ω (τ s)− cD
Ω (τa)
.
On the other hand, the complainant’s expected payoﬀ from demanding τ s is given
by
A (τ s) = {1− F [q (τ s)]}∆ (τ s)
+F [q (τ s)]
⎧
⎨
⎩−cC +
∆ (τa)
R q(τs)
p xf (x) dx
F [q (τ s)]
⎫
⎬
⎭
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Therefore, the FOC is given by A0
¡
τS
¢
= 0, where
A0 (τ s) = −f [q (τ s)] q0 (τ s)∆ (τ s) + {1− F [q (τ s)]}∆0 (τ s)
−f [q (τ s)] q0 (τ s) cC +∆ (τa) q (τ s) f (q (τ s)) q0 (τ s)
= {1− F [q (τ s)]}∆0 (τ s)− f [q (τ s)] q0 (τ s) [∆ (τ s) + cC −∆ (τa) q (τ s)]
Substituting q (τ s) = Ω(τ
s)−cD
Ω(τa) , and q
0 (τ s) = Ω
0(τs)
Ω(τa) in this equation and then applying
Assumption 1, i.e. Ω (τ) ≡ α∆ (τ), yield:
A0 (τ s) = {1− F [q (τ s)]}∆0 (τ s)− f [q (τ s)] Ω
0 (τ s)
Ω (τa)
∙
∆ (τ s) + cC −∆ (τa)
Ω (τ s)− cD
Ω (τa)
¸
= {1− F [q (τ s)]}∆0 (τ s)− f [q (τ s)] α∆
0 (τ s)
α∆ (τa)
∙
∆ (τ s) + cC −∆ (τa)
α∆ (τ s)− cD
α∆ (τa)
¸
=
½
{1− F [q (τ s)]}− f [q (τ s)] cC +
cD
α
∆ (τa)
¾
∆0 (τ s)
Thus, the FOC can be written as:
f [q (τ s)]
1− F [q (τ s)] =
∆ (τa)
cC + cDα
(IV.3)
Moreover,
A00 (τ s) = −
½
f
£
q
¡
τS
¢¤
+ f 0
£
q
¡
τS
¢¤ cC + cDα
∆ (τA)
¾
q0
¡
τS
¢
∆0
¡
τS
¢
= −
½
f
£
q
¡
τS
¢¤
+ f 0
£
q
¡
τS
¢¤ cC + cDα
∆ (τA)
¾ £
∆0
¡
τS
¢¤2
∆ (τA)
.
Therefore, the SOC, A00 (S) < 0, is given by:
f [q (τ s)] + f 0 [q (τ s)]
cC + cDα
∆ (τa)
> 0. (IV.4)
Assuming a monotonic and increasing hazard function for distribution function F , the
SOC will be always satisfied and the First-Order condition given in (IV.3) yields a unique
equilibrium.
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Litigation costs and the likelihood of early settlement
Under the baseline model of Bebchuk (i.e., when α = 1 in this setting), settlement
rate is equally sensitive to the changes of the litigation costs of either party. However,
under the current model (i.e., when α < 1), settlement rate is more responsive to changes
in the defendant’s costs than to changes in the complainant’s costs. To see this, denote the
equilibrium value of q (τ s) by q∗ and rewrite the first-order condition (IV.3) as follows
f (q∗)
1− F (q∗) =
∆
¡
τA
¢
cD
α + cC
. (IV.5)
Since we assume a monotonically increasing hazard function, an increase in the RHS of this
equation results in a higher equilibrium value for q∗, or equivalently, a lower equilibrium
settlement rate. Therefore, the settlement rate is increasing in the litigation costs of either
party.
Proposition 8 The equilibrium settlement rate is increasing in the litigation costs of either
party.
Moreover, since α < 1, a reduction in the defendant’s litigation costs reduces the
likelihood of settlement to a greater extent than does a reduction in the complainant’s costs.
Formally,
Proposition 9 The equilibrium settlement rate is more sensitive to changes in the defen-
dant’s costs than to changes in the complainant’s costs.
Denoting the equilibrium settlement rate by R∗, Propositions 8 and 9 imply:
dR∗
dcD
>
dR∗
dcC
> 0.
Example 1 Suppose that p is distributed according to Beta distribution with shape para-
meters given by (2, 2), i.e.,
f (p) =
Γ (4)
Γ (2)Γ (2)
p (1− p) ,
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where p ∈ [0, 1] and Γ is the gamma function. The hazard function of this probability
distribution is given by
Γ(4)
Γ(2)Γ(2)p (1− p)
1− Γ(4)Γ(2)Γ(2)
R p
0 t (1− t) dt
=
6p
1 + p− 2p2 .
Using this hazard function, the equilibrium condition (IV.5) can be written as
6q∗
1 + q∗ − 2q∗2 =
∆
¡
τA
¢
cD
α + cC
.
Solving for q∗ yields:
q∗ =
Φ− 6 +
√
−12Φ+ 9Φ2 + 36
4Φ
,
where, Φ is equal to the right-hand side of (IV.5). Thus, the likelihood of settlement, R∗ =
1− F (q∗) , is given by
r∗ = 1− Γ (4)
Γ (2)Γ (2)
Z q∗
0
t (1− t) dt
= 1− 3
16Φ2
³
Φ− 6 +
p
9Φ2 − 12Φ+ 36
´2
+
1
32Φ3
³
Φ− 6 +
p
9Φ2 − 12Φ+ 36
´3
As is depicted in the following graph, R∗ is a decreasing function of Φ ≡ ∆(τ
A)
cD
α +cC
, and
Propositions 8 and 9 are verified.
20151050
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r
Figure 13. Equilibrium settlement rate, R∗, as a function of Φ ≡ ∆(τ
A)
cR
α +cC
.
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A Signaling Model
In the previous section I assumed that in the settlement bargaining game the
uninformed party oﬀers a settlement proposal and the informed party decides whether to
accept or reject this proposal. In contrast, in this section I assume that the informed party
is the one that oﬀers a settlement and the uninformed party may accept or reject the oﬀer.
Reinganum and Wilde (1986) introduce a signaling model in which the informed party
signals its type by making a settlement oﬀer.
As in the previous section, I assume that the defendant has private information
about its probability of losing the case in the court, denoted by p. The signaling game is
as follows. The defendant oﬀers a reduction in its import tariﬀ from τd to τ s. The com-
plainant’s strategy, on the other hand, is a function, r (τ s), which specifies the probability
that it rejects the the defendant’s policy adjustment proposal. The expected payoﬀs of the
complainant, if she chooses a rejection probability of ρ, is given by
ΠC (τ s, ρ; b) = [1− ρ]∆ (τ s) + ρ [b (τ s)∆ (τa)− cC ] . (IV.6)
where, b (τ s) represents the complainant’s belief about p given the defendant’s oﬀer, τ s.
Given function r (.), the expected payoﬀ of the defendant from oﬀering τ s is
ΠD (τ s; r (.)) = − [1− r (τ s)]α∆ (τ s)− r (τ s) [pα∆ (τa) + cD] . (IV.7)
An equilibrium for this problem is characterized by a triple (b∗, r∗, τ s∗). An interior
solution for the complainant’s problem requires:
∂ΠC
∂ρ
= −∆ (τ s) + b (τ s)∆ (τa)− cC = 0. (IV.8)
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Moreover, consistency requires b (τ s) = p. Therefore, (IV.8) implies:
∆ (τ s∗) = p∆ (τa)− cC (IV.9)
Furthermore, τ s∗ must maximize the defendant’s expected payoﬀ, given r∗ (·). That is, it
should satisfy the defendant’s first-order condition:
r0 (τ s∗)α∆ (τ s∗)− [1− r (τ s∗)]α∆0 (τ s∗)− r0 (τ s∗) [pα∆ (τa) + cD] = 0
or, equivalently,
−α∆0 (τ s∗) + α∆0 (τ s∗) r (τ s∗)− [αcC + cD] r0 (τ s∗) = 0 (IV.10)
Equation (IV.10) has a one-parameter family of solutions r∗ (∆0 (τ s)) = 1+λ exp
n
− ∆
0(τs)
αcC+cD
o
.
The appropriate boundary condition is r∗ (∆0 (τ s)) = 0, where ∆0 (τ s) = p∆0 (τa) − cC .4
This implies that
λ = − exp
½
p∆0 (τa)− cC
αcC + cD
¾
.
Therefore, the equilibrium probability of rejection as a function of τ s will be given by:
r∗ (τ s) = 1− exp
½
p∆0 (τa)− cC
αcC + cD
¾
exp
½
− ∆
0 (τ s)
αcC + cD
¾
(IV.11)
= 1− exp
½
p∆0 (τa)−∆0 (τ s)− cC
αcC + cD
¾
(IV.12)
Finally, for a particular value of p, the equilibrium settlement rate, R∗ = 1 − r∗, can be
obtained by substituting ∆ (τ s∗) from (IV.9) into (IV.11), namely:
R∗ = exp
½
p∆0 (τa)− p∆0 (τa) + cC − cC
αcC + cD
¾
exp
½
p− p
αcC + cD
∆0 (τa)
¾
4For a discussion of this boundary condition see Reinganum and Wilde (1986).
90
In contrast with the Reinganum and Wilde’s (1986) original model, in the present
formulation the probability of trial depends on the allocation of litigation costs. In partic-
ular, probability of trial is more responsive to changes in the defendant’s litigation costs
than to the complainant’s litigation costs. Therefore, Propositions 8 and 9 hold under the
signaling model as well.
Settlement Bargaining under the Allegation of Indirect Breach
In this Section, I consider disagreements over policies that are not explicitly re-
stricted by the trade agreement but can potentially nullify or impair the benefits of a
contracting party that were intended under the agreement. Such actions, if proved to nul-
lify the eﬀect of the agreement, may be categorized as indirect breach of the contract. In an
indirect breach, while keeping its tariﬀ rates fixed at the agreed-upon levels, the defendant
adopts a policy, such as subsidies, etc, that potentially nullifies/impairs the benefits of the
complainant from the agreement. If such a case is litigated, the court determines the extent
to which the defendant’s policy has nullified the complainant’s gains from the agreement.
If the court’s ruling is against the defendant, the defendant is supposed to take mitigating
actions that restore the benefits of the complainant from the agreement.
In this type of disagreement, the dispute is over the extent of damages imposed
on the complaining party. Such disagreements may arise due to asymmetric information of
the disputing parties about the size of the compensation, denoted by ∆, that the dispute
panel would award to the complainant in case of litigation. I assume that ∆ is the private
information of the complaining party, while the defending party only knows that ∆ is
distributed according to G (·) on the interval ¡∆,∆¢. I also maintain Assumption 1, which
implies that the cost to the defendant of conforming to the panel’s ruling is given by α∆,
91
where 0 < α < 1.
In this Section, I employ the signalling model of Reinganum and Wilde (1986)
to analyze the settlement bargaining problem in the WTO. More specifically, I consider a
bargaining process in which the informed party, i.e., the complainant, demands a policy
adjustment on behalf of the defendant in exchange for settlement. Let S denote the benefit
of the proposed policy adjustment to the complaining party. I continue to maintain As-
sumption 1, which implies that the cost of this policy adjustment to the defending party is
given by αS.
The complainant’s strategy is to demand S to maximize its expected payoﬀ. The
defendant’s strategy, on the other hand, is a function, r (S), which specifies the probability
that it rejects the the complainant’s policy adjustment proposal. The expected payoﬀs of a
defendant who has received a settlement demand S and has a rejection probability of ρ, is
given by
ΠD (S, ρ; b) = − [1− ρ]αS − ρ [αb (S) + cD] . (IV.13)
where, b (S) represents the defendant’s belief about ∆ given the complainant’s demand, S.
Expected payoﬀs of a complainant who would receive an award of the size ∆ by the
dispute panel, demands S to settle, and takes as given the strategy r (S) of the defendant,
is given by
ΠC (S; r) = [1− r (S)]S + r (S) [∆− cC ] . (IV.14)
An equilibrium for this problem is characterized by a triple (b∗, r∗, S∗). An interior
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solution for the defendant’s problem requires:
∂ΠD
∂ρ
= αS − αb (S)− cD = 0. (IV.15)
Moreover, consistency requires b (S) = ∆. Therefore, (IV.15) implies:
S∗ = ∆+
cD
α
. (IV.16)
Furthermore, S∗ must maximize the complainant’s expected payoﬀ, given r∗ (·). That is, it
should satisfy the complainant’s FOC:
[1− r (S∗)] +
£
1− r0 (S∗)
¤
S∗ + r0 (S∗) [∆− cC ] = 0,
or, equivalently,
1 + S∗ − r (S∗)−
³
cC +
cD
α
´
r0 (S∗) = 0 (IV.17)
Equation (IV.17) has a one-parameter family of solutions r∗ (S) = 1 + λ exp
½
− S
cC+
cD
α
¾
.
Applying appropriate boundary conditions, the equilibrium probability of rejection as a
function of S will be given by:
r∗ (S) = 1− exp
½
−
S −∆− cDα
cC + cDα
¾
(IV.18)
Finally, for a particular value of ∆, the equilibrium settlement rate, R∗ = 1 − r∗, can be
obtained by substituting S∗ from (IV.16) into (IV.18), namely:
R∗ = exp
½
− ∆−∆cD
α + cC
¾
In contrast with the Reinganum and Wilde’s (1986) original model, in the present
formulation the probability of trial depends on the allocation of litigation costs. In partic-
ular, probability of trial is more responsive to changes in the defendant’s litigation costs
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than to the complainant’s litigation costs. Therefore, Propositions 1 and 2 hold under the
signaling model as well.
Conclusion
My objective in this paper was to highlight the eﬀect of the compensation mech-
anism that is available to disputing parties on the outcome of pre-trial negotiations. In
particular, I considered trade disputes among the WTO members in which trade policy
adjustments, rather than cash payments, are used to transfer wealth among the member
countries. As opposed to cash payments, policy adjustments are not zero-sum transactions,
in the sense that the payee receives a diﬀerent amount than is paid by the payer. I extended
the classical settlement bargaining models, which consider cash payments as the method of
compensation, to study settlement bargaining in an environment where compensations are
implemented through policy adjustment.
I showed that when policy adjustment is the only compensation mechanism, the
litigation costs of the defending party has a pronounced eﬀect on the likelihood of pre-trial
settlement. Thus, the classic result regarding the independence of the settlement likelihood
and the allocation of litigation costs does not follow under this alternative compensation
mechanism. This result suggests that legal procedures that allocate a larger fraction of the
burden of proof on the defending party should result in a higher settlement rate.
This theory can explain some stark diﬀerences between the behavior of the large
versus small counties in the dispute settlement process of the WTO. In a dispute between
a large and a small economy, the likelihood of settlement is significantly lower when the
large country is named as the defending party. Assuming that smaller countries, which are
also poorer countries in my data set, have higher litigation costs, this observation can be
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interpreted as an indication of the pronounced eﬀect of the defending countries’ litigation
costs in pre-trial negotiations.
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CHAPTER V
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION
Introduction
In this chapter, I use a database of the WTO disputes to estimate the settlement
bargaining models introduced in Chapter IV. I conduct both structural and reduced form
analysis and I find evidence in support of the bargaining models as extended in the previous
chapter.
The theoretical analysis of the previous chapter sheds light on some of the settle-
ment patterns in the WTO. A close look at the dispute settlement pattern in the WTO
reveals some specific relationships between the likelihood of settlement and the type of dis-
puting countries. A first observation is that countries with larger economies settle a dispute
with a lower probability. As demonstrated in Table (2), having a large country, as opposed
to a small country, as the defending party, decreases the likelihood of settlement by 16.4 per-
centage points (i.e., from 70.2% to 53.8%). Similarly, A large-economy defendant decreases
the likelihood of settlement by 24 percentage point. A more interesting observation is that
in a dispute between a large country and a small country, an early settlement is less likely
when the small country is the complaining party. As is shown in Figure 2, 62.5 percent of
disputes in which a large country presses charges against a small country is settled without
establishing a dispute panel. In contrast, if a small country presses charges against a large
country, only 47.8 percent of disputes are settled without establishing a dispute panel.
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Table 2. Settlement rate and the size of the defending and complaining parties
Small-Economy Large-Economy All
Complainant Complainant
Small-Economy Defendant 85.3% (34 cases) 62.5% (40 cases) 73.0% (74 cases)
Large-Economy Defendant 47.8% (23 cases) 49.3% (77 cases) 49.0% (100 cases)
All 70.2 (57 cases) 53.8% (117 cases) 59.2% (174 cases)
A potential explanation for the latter observation may be oﬀered by the political
science literature that attributes settlement behavior in an international setting to the
relative power of disputing parties. A power-based view of the DSP would explain this
observation by the inability of a small-country complainant to induce the large-country
defendant to give concessions without the involvement of the WTO dispute settlement
body. In this chapter, I provide an alternative explanation for diﬀerent settlement behavior
of small and large countries, which is based on relative litigation costs of these countries. I
construct a measure of litigation costs based on the assumption that the cost of pursuing a
dispute in the DSP is greater for poorer countries. It is a widely held view among observers
of the WTO that less developed countries have relatively higher costs of legal work in
the dispute settlement process. For example, Shaﬀer (2003) points out that “lack of legal
expertise in WTO law and the capacity to organize information concerning trade barriers
and opportunities to challenge them [... and] lack of financial resources, including for the
hiring of outside legal counsel,” are challenges faced by the developing countries in using
the WTO legal system eﬀectively. In response to a survey, the WTO delegations from
developing countries have cited the high cost of litigation or a lack of private sector support
as main reasons for not pursuing a complaint (Busch, Reinhardt, and Shaﬀer, 2008).1 I also
construct a measure of the “stake at dispute” based on the volume of export in the disputed
1In fact, in response to concerns about the relatively high costs of legal works for poorer countries,
the Advisory Centre on WTO Law (ACWL) was established in 2001 to provide developing countries with
subsidized legal aid for participation in the DSP. Developing countries can access legal aid through ACWL
for an hourly charge that ranges from $25 for the least developed countries to $200 for the highest income
developing countries (see www.ACWL.ch).
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sector from the complaining country to the defending country. Using a Maximum Likelihood
Estimation (MLE), I show that the probability of settlement is positively correlated with
the litigation costs of the disputants and negatively correlated with the stake at dispute.
These observations are consistent with the prediction of the classic models as well as the
extended model introduced in Chapter IV.
It is also empirically verified in this chapter that the litigation costs of the defending
party has a significantly larger eﬀect on the likelihood of settlement than the litigation costs
of the complaining party. While consistent with the prediction of my model, this observation
is at odds with the prediction of the classical settlement bargaining models, where the total
litigation costs of the disputants —not the distribution of costs— is what matters for the
likelihood of settlement.
I also provide empirical evidence regarding the eﬀect of third-parties and multiplic-
ity of complainants in the bargaining process. I show that a case with multiple complainants
is less likely to be settled without trial. However, I find no or little evidence regarding the
eﬀect of third parties in the pre-trial negotiations. The latter observation is in contrast to
the findings of Busch and Reinhardt (2001) who argue that the presence of third parties in
a dispute hinders the negotiation process and increases the likelihood of litigations. I show
that their result is generated by an endogeneity problem in their empirical work. Once I
correct for this endogeneity problem, this eﬀect is reversed under some specifications of my
model, while it is statistically insignificant under other specifications.
Retaliatory capacity of the complaining parties is also shown to be an important
factor in inducing early settlement. I show that an early settlement is more likely the larger
is the defending country’s volume of exports to the complaining countries. A large volume
of exports from the defending country to the complaining countries gives the complaining
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countries the capacity to impose retaliatory trade barriers against the defending country if
it does not comply with its obligations.
My empirical observations also suggest that the defending country’s import in the
disputed sector from third parties has also a significant eﬀect on the likelihood of pre-trial
settlement, so that the larger is imports from the rest of the world the higher is the likelihood
of a pre-trial settlement. I provide two alternative explanation for this phenomenon, one
which draws on the terms-of-trade argument for protection and one which concerns the
adverse eﬀects of publicizing a dispute in the WTO.
In the past decade there has been a growing number of empirical studies of the
dispute settlement process of GATT and the WTO.2 Guzman and Simmons (2002) consider
the relationship between the nature of the dispute and likelihood of an early settlement.
They hypothesize that if the subject matter of the dispute has an all-or-nothing charac-
ter and leaves little room for compromise (for example, health and safety regulations), the
parties’ ability to reach an agreement is limited and a higher rate of litigation is expected
for such disputes. They find empirical support for their hypothesis only among democratic
states. Busch and Reinhardt (2003) consider the success of developing countries as com-
plainants in this process by investigating the level of concessions that they have been able
to induce from defending countries. In particular, they find that the introduction of a more
legalized system of dispute settlement under the WTO has exaggerated the gap between
developed and developing complainants with respect to their ability to get defendants to
liberalize disputed policies. Nevertheless, Bown (2004 a) provides evidence that developing
country complainants have had more economic success in resolving trade disputes under
the WTO than was the case under the GATT.
2Busch and Reinhardt (2002) provide a survey of this literature.
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A number of papers study the determinants of the decision to initiate a formal dis-
pute. Bown (2005) investigates the determinants of participation in the DSP and examines
whether the new regulations of the DSP under the WTO discourages active engagement by
developing countries. He finds that the size of exports at stake and legal capacity are im-
portant factors in deciding whether to initiate a dispute. Wilckens (2007) also finds that a
country is more likely to file a complaint if its retaliatory capacity is large. Horn, Mavroidis,
and Nordstrom (1999), however, argue that the bias in the pattern of disputes that have
been initiated under the WTO is due to the fact that developed counties have a larger
diversity of imports and exports that naturally leads to more disputable trade policies and
a more frequent use of the DSP by the developed countries.
Data
Data on the disputes filed under the DSU from 1995 to 2004 is taken from Horn
and Mavroidis (2006). This includes information about the disputing parties, the status of
each dispute (i.e., the most recent stage of the dispute), and the Harmonized System (HS)
codes of the products that are subject to dispute. I updated the information regarding
the status of the dispute by checking for new information released on the WTO website. I
also modified the data in cases where the range of products at dispute, as reported by the
complaining parties, was exaggerated or mis-specified. When several parties have similar
complaints against a defending party, they may file a single complaint as co-complainants
or they may file separate complaints. In either case, similar complaints are addressed as a
single case by the DSB. Therefore, when similar cases are filed separately, I combine them
into one single dispute case with multiple complainants. Moreover, in instances where the
same dispute between a pair of member countries is filed multiple times, I eliminated all
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but the most recently-filed case.
Data on trade volume in disputed sectors comes from Feenstra et. al. (2005) for
year 1999. In cases where this piece of data was not available from Feenstra et al, I took
the corresponding 2001 trade volume from the UNComtrade database.
Measure of the stake at dispute
I use ln (trade) as a measure of the stake at dispute, where trade is the size of the
bilateral trade that is aﬀected by the disputed policy. Ideally, the magnitude of the alleged
trade barrier as well as the elasticities of demand and supply in the disputed sector should
be also included in the calculation of the size of the stake at dispute. However, I don’t have
reliable data on these variables.
The stake at dispute may be also aﬀected by the defending country’s volume of
imports from third countries. In a three-country model of trade where the defending party
imports from the complaining party as well as the rest of the world, it can be shown that
the stake at dispute for the defending party is decreasing in its import volume from the rest
of the world. To account for this eﬀect, I also include ln (I_ROW ) in the regression model,
where I_ROW is the defending party’s volume of imports in the disputed sector from the
rest of the world.
Measure of litigation costs
It is a widely held view among observers of the WTO that less developed countries
have relatively higher costs of legal work in the dispute settlement process. For example,
Shaﬀer (2003) points out that "lack of legal expertise in WTO law and the capacity to
organize information concerning trade barriers and opportunities to challenge them [... and]
lack of financial resources, including for the hiring of outside legal counsel," are challenges
faced by the developing countries in using the WTO legal system eﬀectively. In fact, in
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response to concerns about the relatively high costs of legal works for poorer countries,
the Advisory Centre on WTO Law (ACWL) was established in 2001 to provide developing
countries with subsidized legal aid for participation in the DSP.3
On this basis, I use ln(GDP_US) ln(c)ln(GDP_D) and
ln(GDP_US) ln(c)
ln(GDP_C) as a measure of D’s and
C’s litigation costs, respectively, where c is the average legal fees paid by disputing countries
in case of litigation, GDP_D and GDP_C are gross domestic product in D and C, and
GDP_US is the GDP of the United States. This measure only depends on the disputing
party’s GDP and not on the characteristics of the case, e.g., the complexity of the legal issues
involved. While it would be interesting to include case-specific factors in the construction
of this measure, it has been pointed out by observers that litigation costs are more or less
independent of the commercial stakes involved in a dispute (Nordström and Shaﬀer, 2008).
I construct an alternative measure of litigation costs using the information about
the size of the country’s mission to theWTO in Geneva. This data is taken fromMichalopou-
los (1999). The idea is that if a country has a larger mission to the WTO in Geneva, it will
face a smaller marginal cost of pursuing a dispute case in the DSP, while a country with
a small or no permanent mission will have to hire additional staﬀ to represent the country
in the DSP. The cost of maintaining a permanent mission will be considered a sunk cost at
the time that a government makes a decision about pursuing a dispute and, thus, it does
not aﬀect the litigation decision.
Other control variables
As was mentioned above, some disputes involve multiple complaining parties or
third parties that join the dispute as interested parties. The existence of multiple parties in
a dispute can have a significant eﬀect on the outcome. To control for these potential eﬀects,
3Developing countries can access legal aid through ACWL for an hourly charge that ranges from $25 for
the least developed countries to $200 for the highest income developing countries (see www.ACWL.ch).
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I include multiple-complainant and third-party dummy variables in the estimation models
below.
The Econometric Models
I use several econometric models to test the predictions of the model set out in
Chapter IV. I first take a structural approach and estimate the parameters of the screening
model set out above. Recall from the screening model presented in Chapter IV that p
denotes the probability of a guilty determination by the dispute panel and q (cC , cD,∆)
denotes an equilibrium cutoﬀ point such that a settlement is achieved iﬀ p ≥ q (cC , cD,∆).
Therefore, the probability of settlement as a function of cC , cD, and ∆, is given by
Pr [p ≥ q (cC , cD,∆)] = 1− F [q (cC , cD,∆)] ,
and the likelihood function can be written as
L = (1− F [q (cC , cD,∆)])s (F [q (cC , cD,∆)])1−s ,
where s is the settlement dummy. In order to run an MLE, some functional forms should
be assumed for F and q. Since 0 ≤ p ≤ 1, a natural choice for F is the Beta Distribution,
whose support is [0, 1]. As shown in Example 1, assuming F˜Beta(2, 2), the equilibrium
probability of settlement is given by
Pr (s = 1|cC , cD,∆) = 1− 3
16Φ2
³
Φ− 6 +
p
9Φ2 − 12Φ+ 36
´2
(V.1)
+
1
32Φ3
³
Φ− 6 +
p
9Φ2 − 12Φ+ 36
´3
,
where, Φ = ∆β1cD+β2cC , and β1 and β2 are structural parameters to be estimated. Note that
Propositions 1 and 2 predict that β1 > β2 > 0, and my objective is to test this prediction
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empirically.
One diﬃculty in estimating β1 and β2 is the high correlation between
cD
∆ and
cC
∆ , which are the explanatory variables in this econometric model. The cause of the high
correlation is the common denominator, ∆, used in the construction of these variables. One
approach to solve this colinearity problem is to use the average value of ∆ in the above
formulation. I normalize this average value to 1 so that Φ = 1β1cD+β2cC .
I also estimate probability models that are not based on the above model but can
be used to test the correlation between the settlement decision and relevant explanatory
variables. In one specification, I relax some of the structure that was introduced by the
theoretical model, by assuming a linear relationship between q, i.e., the marginal type of the
defendant, and the explanatory variables. In particular, I consider the following probability
model:
Pr(s = 1|X) = Pr ¡1− p < β0X¢ , (V.2)
where, X is the vector of explanatory variables and β is the vector of parameters to be
estimated. As before, I assume that p is distributed according to the Beta distribution with
shape parameters given by (2, 2). The results of a Maximum Likelihood Estimation of this
model is reported in Table 3.
Finally, I take a fully non-structural approach and estimate probit and logit mod-
els.
Empirical Results
In this Section, I evaluate the following hypotheses that are derived from Propo-
sitions 8 and 9 of Chapter IV:
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Hypothesis 1: Settlement rate is negatively correlated with the trade volume be-
tween the disputing parties in the disputed sector.
Hypothesis 2: Settlement rate is positively correlated with the measures of litiga-
tion costs.
Hypothesis 3: Settlement rate is more sensitive to changes in the litigation costs
of the defending party than to changes in the litigation costs of the complaining party.
In addition to these hypotheses, I will also be able to discuss other factors that may
influence the outcome of settlement negotiations, including the existence of third parties
and co-complainants, and relevant trade flows.
Table 2 reports the estimated values of the parameters of the structural probability
model given in (V.1). This estimation provides strong support for Hypothesis 2, which states
the likelihood of settlement is positively correlated with the litigation costs of each party.
In specifications 2, 3, 5, and 6, I control for diﬀerent trade flows that are potentially related
to the dispute, including the total exports from the complainants to the defendant in the
disputed sector. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, the likelihood of settlement is negatively
correlated with this trade volume. Hypothesis 3, which states that settlement likelihood is
sensitive to the allocation of litigation costs, is also supported empirically when we control
for relevant trade flows. As seen in columns 2 and 3, this hypothesis is rejected with
probability 0.05 and 0.1 respectively.
Similar results are obtained from the other empirical models that were introduced
in the previous Section. The coeﬃcient for the bilateral trade volume in the disputed sector
is always negative and statistically significant across all models. Therefore, Hypothesis 1
cannot be rejected. Also consistent with Hypothesis 2, the coeﬃcient for the litigation cost
of the defending party is positive and significant across all models. The coeﬃcient for the
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litigation of the complaining party is also generally consistent withe Hypothesis 2. These
models also provide empirical evidence in support of Hypothesis 3. In each table, I report
the result of a one-sided t-test that the coeﬃcient for the defending party’s litigation cost
is larger than that of the complaining party’s litigation cost. As in the structural model,
these estimations are consistent with Hypothesis 3 when we control for relevant trade flows.
Is three a crowd?
What is the eﬀect of third parties on the outcome of pre-trial negotiations? Busch
and Reinhardt (2006) hypothesize that third parties undermine pre-trial negotiations by
increasing the negotiation costs. In fact, as they point out, "61 percent of disputes with
no third parties ended in early settlement, in contrast to 26 percent of disputes with third
parties. Likewise, nine percent of disputes without third parties ended in a ruling, whereas
fully 45 percent of disputes with third parties went the legal distance." However, it is
important to note that most third parties join a dispute after pre-trial negotiations break
down. Therefore, one can argue that this is the breakdown of pre-trial negotiations that
attracts third parties to join the dispute, and not the other way around.
To analyze the eﬀect of third parties on the pre-trial negotiations, I define a third-
party dummy variable that is equal to 1 if at least one third party joined the negotiations
prior to the establishment of a WTO dispute panel. My estimation does not provide
evidence in support of the Busch and Reinhardt hypothesis. As can be seen in Tables 2-5,
the third-party dummy is not statistically significant in most of the models. Moreover, in
specifications where this dummy variable is statistically significant (column 4 in Table 2 and
column 5 in Table 3), the sign of the coeﬃcient is positive. In other words, my empirical
results indicate that if third parties have any eﬀect on pre-trial negotiations, it is an increase
106
in the likelihood of out-of-court settlement.
While I do not find strong empirical evidence regarding the influence of third
parties in pre-trial negotiations, I do find evidence regarding the eﬀect of multiplicity of
complainants in the outcome of negotiations. As can be seen in Tables 2-5, the coeﬃcient
of the multiple-complainant dummy is negative and statistically significant in almost all
specifications. The existence of multiple complainants may reduce the likelihood of settle-
ment by increasing the stake at dispute. However, this result is robust even if we control for
measures of the stake at dispute such as the disputed trade volume between the defendant
and the complaining parties.
Retaliation capacity
The Dispute Settlement Process of the WTO does not provide any external en-
forcement of the agreement. Instead the system relies on the retaliatory power of the injured
countries against the oﬀending countries to enforce trade agreements. Therefore, the re-
taliatory capacity of the complaining parties may influence the outcome of the pre-trial
negotiations. Retaliatory actions are normally in the form of import restrictions in the in-
jured country against the products from the oﬀending country. Thus, the volume of export
from the defending country to the complaining countries can be used as a measure of the
complainants’ retaliation capacity.
My empirical observation suggests that total volume of exports from the defending
country to the complaining countries has a positive eﬀect on the likelihood of settlement.
In other words, when the threat of retaliation is more serious a settlement is more likely. It
might indicate the fact that a defending country is more willing to give concessions when
the prospect of retaliations is stronger.4
4My study, however, does not provide direct support for this hypothesis since I do not have information
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Imports from the rest of the world: the terms-of-trade argument and the
eﬀect of nondiscrimination clause
My empirical observation suggests that the defending country’s import in the
disputed sector from third parties has also a significant eﬀect on the likelihood of pre-trial
settlement. In most of the specifications, the coeﬃcient of this variable is positive and
statistically significant. That is, while the volume of the defendant’s imports from the
complaining countries has a negative eﬀect on the likelihood of settlement, its volume of
imports from the rest of the world (ROW) is positively correlated with the probability of
pre-trial settlement.
There are two potential channels through which the defendant’s volume of imports
from the ROW can aﬀect the likelihood of settlement. First, consider a three-country world,
with countries labeled as D (for defendant), C (for complainant) and ROW (for rest of the
world), in which D imports a particular product from C and ROW. Suppose that D imposes
a tariﬀ on imports from C while it maintains free trade with the ROW (i.e., D discriminates
against C). D can gain from the tariﬀs imposed on the imports from C by improving its terms
of trade. However, it can be shown that D’s terms-of-trade gains are diluted if imports from
the ROW picks up in response to a reduction in imports from C. In other words, a defending
country’s stake at dispute is inversely related to its volume of imports in the disputed sector
from the rest of the world. Therefore, the positive coeﬃcient of this variable is consistent
with Hypothesis 1. Moreover, this observation is consistent with the findings of Bagwell
and Staiger (2006) that trade negotiators are concerned with the terms-of-trade externality
of trade policies.
regarding the level of concessions oﬀered in pre-trial negotitations. Bown (2004) uses the increase in the
exports from the complaining country to the defending country in the disputed sector as a measure of
concessions given by the defending country, and shows that this measure is positively correlated with a
measure of retaliatory capacity of the complaining country. In another paper ( Bown 2004) he shows
that power consideration also aﬀects the countries’ decision to choose from diﬀerent types of protectionist
poslicies.
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Now consider a case where D imposes a non-discriminatory trade barrier against
imports from all foreign countries, i.e., C and ROW, but only C challenges the policy
through a formal WTO dispute. The countries in the ROW may not want to initiate a
dispute due to high costs of negotiations or their low individual stake at dispute.5 However,
once the dispute panel rules against the disputed action, all aﬀected countries, including
those in the ROW, will also benefit from the ruling. This is because a policy adjustment in
the defending country must conform to the Most Favored Nation (MFN) clause.
As a result of the MFN clause, the cost to the defending party of losing in the court
is potentially much larger than the cost of compensating the complaining party. Therefore,
a defending party has more incentive to settle without a formal trial in order to avoid
attracting more interested parties to the dispute. This incentive to settle is stronger, the
larger is the defending country’s volume of import in the disputed sector from the ROW.
Conclusion
In this chapter I tested some of the empirical predictions of the dispute settlement
models introduced in Chapter IV. It is empirically verified that settlement likelihood is pos-
itively correlated with the litigation costs of the disputing parties, and negatively correlated
with measures of stake at dispute. In this empirical work I focused on the determinants of
early settlements, while interesting questions regarding the policy adjustments as a result
of settlement negotiations remain unexplored in this paper. Nevertheless, Bown (2004b)
and Busch and Reinhardt (2003), provide interesting empirical observations regarding the
eﬀect of pursuing a dispute in the WTO on trade policies of the defending party.
5Another reason that may prevent a country from filing a dispute is its lack of information regarding
the alleged violations of the defending party. Daughety and Reinganum (1999) provide a model of settle-
ment bargaining in which litigation can attract more plaintiﬀs by publicizing the information regarding the
culpability of the defendant.
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Table 3. Estimated Parameters for the Semi-Structural Model using Beta Distribution
Beta Distribution 1 2 3 4 5 6
(semi-structural)
0.136 0.342 0.331 0.153 0.098 0.103
(0.058)** (0.096)*** (0.097)*** (0.045)*** (0.037)*** (0.037)***
0.106 0.205 0.218 0.119 0.061 0.064
(0.056)* (0.079)*** (0.081)*** (0.045)*** 0.038 (0.038)*
-0.073 -0.075 -0.031 -0.031
(0.015)*** (0.016)*** (0.016)* (0.016)*
0.068 0.068 0.021 0.02
(0.010)*** (0.010)*** (0.010)** (0.009)**
0.056 0.056 0.017 0.016
(0.023)** (0.023)** 0.011 0.011
-0.148 -0.094 -0.101 -0.126 -0.139 -0.152
(0.058)** 0.064 0.065 (0.052)** (0.062)** (0.062)**
0.068 0.072 0.141 0.088
0.083 0.085 (0.081)* 0.084
-1.195 -4.202 -4.189
(0.508)** (1.349)*** (1.359)***
Observations 174 173 173 174 173 173
log likelihood -108.32 -104.38 -103.99 -114.14 -106.71 -106.09
Probability of the rejection of 
Hypothesis 3 ((β1>β2) 0.359 0.052 0.101 0.348 0.285 0.273
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Litigation costs of the 
complaining party (β2)
Third-party Dummy
Constant
Mission-size dummy used to construct a 
measure of litigation costs
Total exports from 
Complainants to Defendant in 
the disputed sector
Defendant's imports from
the ROW in the disputed
sector
Total exports from
Defendant to the
Complainants
Multiple Complainant Dummy
GDP used to construct a measure of 
litigation costs
Litigation costs of the 
defending party (β1)
Table 4. Maximum Likelihood Estimation Results using Beta Distribution (Non-Structural)
Beta Distribution 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
(non-structural)
0.112 0.117 0.238 0.155 0.166 0.12
(0.041)*** (0.041)*** (0.081)*** (0.021)*** (0.022)*** (0.026)***
0.063 0.072 0.1 0.138 0.137 0.062
(0.038)* (0.038)* (0.058)* (0.022)*** (0.022)*** (0.026)**
-0.04 -0.034 -0.039 -0.035
(0.015)*** (0.014)** (0.015)*** (0.015)**
0.036 0.027 0.019 0.018
(0.010)*** (0.009)*** (0.009)** (0.009)**
0.028 0.021 -0.013 -0.017
0.021 (0.009)** 0.012 0.012
-0.159 -0.153 -0.14 -0.179 -0.131
(0.058)*** (0.061)** (0.043)*** (0.060)*** (0.059)**
0.068 0.051 0.148 0.102
0.07 0.073 (0.051)*** 0.072
-0.627 -0.691 -2.151 0.965 1.023
(0.312)** (0.326)** (1.140)* (0.145)*** (0.151)***
Observations 174 174 173 174 174 173 173 173
log likelihood -111.34 -107.65 -100.69 -133.98 -127.35 -104.53 -108.13 -105.64
Probability of the rejection of 
Hypothesis 3 0.224 0.24 0.029 0.337 0.245 0.1 N/A N/A
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
No cost measure included
Litigation costs of the 
defending party
Litigation costs of the 
complaining party
Third-party Dummy
Constant
Mission-size dummy used to construct a 
measure of litigation costs
Total exports from 
Complainants to Defendant in 
the disputed sector
Defendant's imports from
the ROW in the disputed
sector
Total exports from
Defendant to the
Complainants
Multiple Complainant Dummy
GDP used to construct a measure of 
litigation costs
Table 5. Probit Estimation Results 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
0.454 0.941 0.968 0.306 0.251 0.294
(0.170)*** (0.331)*** (0.338)*** (0.111)*** (0.101)** (0.145)**
0.274 0.426 0.411 0.192 0.079 0.067
(0.160)* (0.246)* (0.249)* (0.111)* 0.106 0.152
-0.167 -0.159 -0.151 -0.138 -0.147 -0.136
(0.061)*** (0.062)** (0.058)*** (0.060)** (0.059)** (0.060)**
0.14 0.145 0.088 0.09 0.07 0.071
(0.044)*** (0.046)*** (0.035)** (0.039)** (0.035)** (0.036)**
0.129 0.118 0.016 -0.009 -0.051 -0.065
0.082 0.084 0.036 0.066 0.047 0.048
-0.533 -0.71 -0.674 -0.514
(0.237)** (0.235)*** (0.245)*** (0.231)**
0.385 0.366
0.281 0.287
-4.708 -10.969 -10.898 -0.466 0.305 1.804 2.017
(1.440)*** (4.703)** (4.805)** (0.259)* 1.296 (0.598)*** (0.614)***
Observations 174 173 173 174 173 173 173 173
log likelihood -111.2 -103.91 -101.36 -108.13 -107.28 -103.13 -108.33 -105.83
Probability of the rejection of 
Hypothesis 3 0.239 0.038 0.029 0.25 0.166 0.107 N/A N/A
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Third-party Dummy
Constant
Mission-size dummy used to construct a 
measure of litigation costs
Total exports from 
Complainants to Defendant in 
the disputed sector
Defendant's imports from
the ROW in the disputed
sector
Total exports from
Defendant to the
Complainants
Multiple Complainant Dummy
GDP used to construct a measure of 
litigation costs
No cost measure included
Litigation costs of the 
defending party
Litigation costs of the 
complaining party
Probit
Table 6. Logit Estimation Results
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
0.749 1.568 1.527 0.495 0.407 0.463
(0.285)*** (0.562)*** (0.574)*** (0.186)*** (0.168)** (0.169)***
0.462 0.738 0.72 0.312 0.124 0.282
(0.269)* (0.421)* (0.428)* (0.185)* 0.175 (0.169)*
-0.275 -0.262 -0.243 -0.062 -0.236 -0.222
(0.102)*** (0.104)** (0.096)** (0.027)** (0.096)** (0.099)**
0.233 0.234 0.142 0.113 0.117
(0.077)*** (0.081)*** (0.059)** (0.058)* (0.061)*
0.216 0.184 0.026 -0.084 -0.105
0.136 0.14 0.059 0.077 0.079
-0.917 -1.154 -1.104 -0.841
(0.403)** (0.390)*** (0.393)*** (0.378)**
0.398 0.638 0.669
0.487 0.464 0.46
-7.841 -18.527 -17.616 -0.758 2.92 3.273
(2.476)*** (7.994)** (8.114)** (0.424)* (0.995)*** (1.022)***
Observations 174 173 173 174 173 174 173 173
log likelihood -111.17 -103.97 -101.24 -113.09 -107.42 -107.23 -108.43 -105.91
Probability of the rejection of 
Hypothesis 3 0.244 0.043 0.056 0.342 0.169 0.261 N/A N/A
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
No cost measure included
Litigation costs of the 
defending party
Litigation costs of the 
complaining party
Logit
Third-party Dummy
Constant
Mission-size dummy used to construct a 
measure of litigation costs
Total exports from 
Complainants to Defendant in 
the disputed sector
Defendant's imports from
the ROW in the disputed
sector
Total exports from
Defendant to the
Complainants
Multiple Complainant Dummy
GDP used to construct a measure of 
litigation costs
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